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A Time of Change
 
It is a time of change in the William James Society
(WJS) as we complete our third full calendar-year as a
constitutionalized professional association. In particular,
the WJS Executive Committee has decided to rethink the
modes of communication and scholarship used and sup-
ported by the Society’s funds. With 
 
Streams
 
 approxi-
mately $2500 per year to publish, such a cost projects out
to become a prohibitive amount in the near future. To
address this issue, several moves have been made and ini-
tiatives launched.
 
First:
 
 It must be stated upfront that this will be the
final issue of 
 
Streams of William James
 
. (Last year founder
Randall Albright offered his resignation as editor, and this
spring the Executive Committee accepted his offer effec-
tive the end of 2004.) In 1999, Randall’s initiative and lead-
ership took an idea that brought together a group of
persons interested in the “thought and character of Will-
iam James” and gave it voice through this printed
medium. That group has grown and solidified over the
years almost single-handedly through his efforts. Randall
remains involved with WJS as a Fellow of the Society and
a valuable asset to our efforts in the future. The Executive
Committee, on behalf of the entire membership, wants to
thank him for his efforts in shepherding us through the
earliest stages of the development of WJS.
 
Second:
 
 We have chosen to divide the current func-
tions of 
 
Streams
 
 more cleanly and clearly so that they may
be better addressed through the multiple media available
to us. These functions as we see them are: scholarship &
essay contests; news & notes; musings, art, poetry, and so
forth. It is our desire to approach each of these functions
with tools best suited for their distribution. In the case of
scholarship, we have started the process of developing an
annual publication entitled 
 
William James Studies
 
 under
editor-in-chief and former WJS president, Linda Simon
(Skidmore). Prof. Simon will be aided by Mark Moller
(Denison) as managing editor and an expansive editorial
board of well-known James scholars. Meanwhile, news
and notes about the Society will be handled through an
annual postal mailing and periodic e-mailings (as well as
postings on the WJS website). All other functions are to
be more thoroughly developed on the Society’s webpage
(or other appropriate media).
We hope that you will find the changes, while signifi-
cant, to be as exciting as we do. Please let us know what
you think and whether you would be interested in helping
in the development of these new initiatives by contacting
us at <wjs@pragmatism.org>. Thank you.
 
WJS Executive Committee 
Election
 
During the first week of December, an e-mail ballot
was sent to all members with valid e-mail address. We
regret the partial disenfranchisement this causes, but
have decided the medium is more expedient than postal
ballots and the coverage far greater than the annual busi-
ness meeting. Upon the identification by the Nominating
Committee of potential candidates, those who agreed to
be considered for open positions on the Executive Com-
mittee are as follows. Since Volume 6, Issue 3 of 
 
Streams
 
is going to press in the midst of the election, by the time
you read this the results will already be in, but we thought
it important that you have a(nother) chance to see the
original slate of nominees.
 
Vice President (2005)/President (2006)-elect
 
Peter H. Hare is State University of New York Distin-
guished Service Professor of Philosophy Emeritus
 
At-large Representative (2005-2006—vote for
one only)
 
Douglas Anderson teaches in the Philosophy Depart-
ment at the Pennsylvania State University
Paul Jerome Croce is professor and chair of Ameri-
can Studies at Stetson University
Henry Jackman is an associate professor at Toronto’s
York University
Sami Pihlström is currently Docent and University
Lecturer of theoretical philosophy at the University of
Helsinki
 
Secretary-Treasurer (2005-2007)
 
D. Micah Hester is Assistant Professor of Medical
Humanities at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sci-
ences
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Introduction to 
“Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” 
and William James’s 
Philosophy of Mind
 
by Jacob Lynn Goodson
 
This collection of essays was presented originally at
the Fourth Annual Donald G. Wester Philosophy Confer-
ence at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, Okla-
homa in April of 2004. The authors of these essays came
together to celebrate the centennial of the publication of
William James’s famous essay “Does ‘Consciousness’
Exist?” The topic of the conference was broadly conceived
as “William James’s Philosophy of Mind,” and that topic
better describes the essays in this collection.
This collection begins with Russell Goodman’s
“James on the Nonconceptual.” Goodman tells us a story
about how the nonconceptual has functioned in James’s
philosophy. In this story, Goodman connects James’s use
of the nonconceptual with that of the philosophy of mind
of Bergson, Hume, and McDowell. Goodman concludes
with three different sets of questions that can and should
be asked after such an important story on James on the
nonconceptual is told. 
Through the play of Jamesian word games, Raphael
C. Allison’s “Reading Material: William James and the
Language of Consciousness” argues that James gave con-
siderable attention to language in describing human con-
sciousness. Allison shows the creative and humorous
ways that James employs to describe consciousness. Con-
trary to those who think that James’s philosophical psy-
chology does not give enough attention to language,
Allison shows how James in fact gives careful attention to
language in his attempts to describe how consciousness
works.   
In his essay, “In Cold Blood: James and Wittgenstein
on Emotions,” Mathew A. Foust places himself amongst
scholars such as Russell Goodman, Stanley Hauerwas,
James McClendon, Hilary Putnam, and Everett Tarbox
who find the linguistic philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
useful as a tool for understanding James’s philosophical
psychology. Foust argues that James and Wittgenstein
have similar understandings of emotions and the body.
Foust argues that Wittgenstein does have some criticisms
of James’s understanding of the emotions, but Foust
rightly concludes that James’s 
 
Varieties
 
 does subvert
some of those criticisms.             
In his “Was James a Reductionist?” Stanley Harrison
answers this important question “yes” and “no.” James is
not a reductionist, according to Harrison, in the sense of
reducing mind to matter. James is a reductionist, though,
in the sense of reducing metaphysics to pure experience.
Harrison uses James’s friend C. S. Peirce to show that
James does not reduce mind to matter in his “Does ‘Con-
sciousness’ Exist?” because James’s denial of conscious-
ness as an entity is not a denial at all since no one in the
history of philosophy argues that consciousness is an
entity. Following Wesley Cooper and Owen Flanagan,
Harrison shows that James does reduce all of metaphys-
ics to that of pure experience. Again following Peirce, Har-
rison concludes that James’s use of pure experience does
not describe experience at all and thus James should have
used a different name for his doctrine of pure experience.
But, following Cooper, Harrison also concludes that
James’s use of pure experience is ironically what James
uses as his defense for the possibility of the divine.
In his essay, “On Habit and Consciousness: A
Peircean Critique of James’s Conception of Habit,” Tamba
Nlandu also uses Peirce to critique James’s philosophy of
mind. Nlandu focuses specifically on the difference
between the use of habit in James and Peirce. Nlandu
argues that James’s use of habit is insufficient because
James has a nominalist use of habit and thus does not
take into account the general law that habits are.
Francesca Bordogna gives us the historical context
for James’s uses of both communities and selves. Bordo-
gna shows how the body is politicized for James, and thus
his philosophy of mind assumes his political convictions.
The two issues cannot be separated, according to Bordo-
gna, and understanding how he thought about politics
helps in interpreting his philosophy of mind.
Jonathan Mathys’s “The Paradigm of Consciousness
and William James’s Conception of the Self” is the last
essay in this collection. Like Goodman’s essay, Mathys
tells a story concerning James’s philosophy of mind. The
story that Mathys tells is one that makes an early James/
latter James distinction in the context of what Mathys
calls the “paradigm of consciousness.” According to
Mathys, the early James is in the “paradigm of conscious-
ness” whereas the latter James is not. The early James is
in the “paradigm of consciousness” in that he prioritizes
the role of consciousness in the individual above that of a
dialogical understanding of consciousness. The latter
James, namely in his denial of consciousness as an
“entity,” does not have this individualistic use of con-
sciousness and thus has a more dialogical use of con-
sciousness.    
This collection of essays begins and ends with stories
concerning James’s philosophy of mind. Furthermore, the
story of James’s philosophy of mind makes some impor-
tant and interesting turns. This collection of essays cele-
brates the centennial of one of those turns entitled “Does
‘Consciousness’ Exist?”
 
—Jacob Lynn Goodson finished his Masters in Theolog-
ical Studies degree at Garrett Evangelical Theological Sem-
inary at Northwestern University in 2004. He plans to
begin a Ph.D. program in 2005. He is grateful to Randall
Albright, John Shook, and the William James Society for the
opportunity to be guest editor for this issue. E-mail =
jacob_goodson@hotmail.com
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James on the Nonconceptual
 
by Russell B. Goodman
 
It pays to read James as someone having something
genuinely new to say, but nowhere is this a more chal-
lenging task than in two works he composed near the end
of his life, 
 
A Pluralistic Universe
 
 and 
 
Some Problems of Phi-
losophy
 
. Certainly in these works James himself had the
feeling that there was something new and important to
say about the limitations of concepts. Yet he struggled to
express what this was. It is in hopes of catching a glimpse,
or even more, of what James might have been about, that
I undertake this essay of gathering and commentary. Part
of the interest of this enterprise is that it concerns James
in the second half of his most productive philosophical
decade, a decade that saw the publication of 
 
Varieties of
Religious Experience
 
, 
 
Pragmatism
 
, and the essays defining
what came to be known as “radical empiricism.” Another
point of interest is that James’s discussion takes us to the
heart of his relationship with Henri Bergson, for by the
time of 
 
A Pluralistic Universe
 
 (1907-8) James had become
convinced that Bergson’s philosophy held the key to his
own research on nonconceptuality.
 
1. 
 
James’s views about the non-conceptual have their
sources in his original masterpiece, 
 
The Principles of Psy-
chology
 
.
 
1
 
 Consider his famous statement that: “The baby,
assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails all at once,
feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion.”
(
 
Principles
 
, p. 462). About the baby’s state we may ask: 1)
How does James know the baby is in such a state? Like
many statements in 
 
The Principles
 
, this one is based on no
empirical evidence except James’s own introspection (and
of course he is no longer a baby). 2) Is this a state attained
only by babies or can adults attain it also? 3) Is this state
in any way non-conceptual? Answers to all these questions
occur in an earlier passage in 
 
The Principles
 
, to which
James refers his readers in his discussion of the baby:
 
millions of items of the outward order are present to my
senses which never properly enter my experience. Why?
Because they have no
 
 interest
 
 for me. 
 
My experience is
what I agree to attend to
 
. Only those items which I 
 
notice
 
shape my mind
 
—
 
without selective interest, experience is
an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis,
light and shade, background and foreground
 
—
 
intelligible
perspective, in a word (
 
Principles
 
, pp. 380-1).
 
This passage illustrates James’s voluntarism—I “agree” to
attend to certain things, though this agreement need not
be conscious or explicit. There is also some tension in the
statement. On the one hand, without attention experience
is said to be “an utter chaos.” I take this to mean that its
“parts are undistinguished,” or that it is a formless void or
abyss.
 
2
 
 But on the other hand, James claims that “millions
of items” are present to his senses without entering into
his experience. How can the chaotic, unformed pre-expe-
riential content of experience nevertheless contain count-
able, hence separable, “items”? There is a similar tension
in the idea that for the baby experience is “a blooming,
buzzing confusion.”   “Confusion” is the equivalent of
“chaos,” but “blooming” and “buzzing” suggest 
 
some
 
structure. It seems to me better to say not that the confu-
sion has no structure but that it, as it were, has too much
structure, that it is—as James will say in 
 
Some Problems of
Philosophy
 
—a “much-at-once.” But I am getting ahead of
my story.
James refers to the baby’s state of blooming, buzzing,
confusion in a footnote to his chapter on “Attention” in
 
The Principles.
 
 The context is a remarkable passage in
which he states that the condition of the baby is not only
attained by adults, but that it is attained “several times a
day.”
 
We all know this latter state, even in its extreme
degree. Most people probably fall several times a day
into a fit of something like this: The eyes are fixed on
vacancy, the sounds of the world melt into confused
unity, the attention is dispersed so that the whole body is
felt, as it were, at once, and the foreground of conscious-
ness is filled, if by anything, by a sort of solemn sense of
surrender to the empty passing of time. In the dim back-
ground of our mind we know meanwhile what we ought
to be doing: getting up, dressing ourselves, answering the
person who has spoken to us, trying to make the next step
in our reasoning. But somehow we cannot 
 
start
 
; the 
 
 pen-
sée   derriere la tête
 
 fails to pierce the shell of lethargy
that wraps our state about. Every moment we expect the
spell to break, for we know no reason why it should con-
tinue. But it does continue, pulse after pulse, and we float
with it, until—also without reason that we can discover—
an energy is given, something—we know not what—
enables us to gather ourselves together, we wink our
eyes, we shake our heads, the background-ideas become
effective, and the wheels of life go round again (
 
Princi-
ples
 
, p. 382).
 
3
 
Such passages of exquisite phenomenological description
are one of the pleasures of reading William James, and
this one illustrates many of the main themes of 
 
The Princi-
ples of Psychology
 
. The concept of the foreground and
background, for example, runs through James’s philoso-
phy from start to finish—with the foreground that which
we are most attentive to, but with the background present
 
1.
 
William James, 
 
The Principles of Psychology
 
 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard U P, 1981/83). Originally published in 1890. Hereinafter
cited as 
 
Principles
 
.
 
2.
 
Oxford English Dictionary
 
 (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1991)
 
3.
 
This seems to be the passage Wittgenstein has in mind in charac-
terizing introspection as a form of vacant staring. However, this is
not the way James presents the case. See my discussion in 
 
Wit-
tgenstein and William James
 
 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U P,
2002).
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also, and with no sharp line between one and the other. In
this passage the background consists of knowledge and
ideas about what we ought to be doing, what someone has
said to us, and so on. So it is clear that the experiences
James describes here are at least partially conceptualized.
But in the foreground of attention is “the empty passing of
time,” “eyes...fixed on vacancy,” sounds melted into “con-
fused unity,” and a “dispersed attention.” This foreground
consciousness has many of the marks of the non-concep-
tual: emptiness, lack of form, interpenetration of elements
(“melt”).
James’s ideas about interpenetration are based on his
discussion in “The Stream of Thought” chapter in 
 
The
Principles,
 
 where he holds that:
 
Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in
the free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense
of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of
whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is
to lead (
 
Principles
 
, p. 246).
 
These dying echoes and dawning senses are part of the
background of consciousness. Although the stream of
thought is James’s metaphor for normal consciousness,
not for the abnormal state of vacancy described above, we
can now see that the interpenetration and melting of that
abnormal state only continues, or perhaps intensifies,
standard features of consciousness. 
 James characterizes the state of vacant staring as a
“confused unity.” According to James, even confused or
chaotic consciousness forms a unity, a position which is
fundamental to James’s disagreement with the Kantian
school. For Kant, consciousness is originally a manifold
that is unified through the application of synthesizing
structures such as the category of causality. For James,
on the contrary, consciousness is originally a unity,
although a flowing differentiated one. The separation or
distinction of its parts, rather than their synthesis or unifi-
cation, is the achievement of the intellect. The 
 
Oxford
English Dictionary
 
 defines “confusion” as a “mixture in
which the distinction of the elements is lost by fusion,
blending, or intimate intermingling,” and “confused” as
“blended so that the distinction of elements is lost.” James
sees us as starting with an original confusion or blending,
the separation of which is the function of concepts. 
 
2. 
 
James again takes up the question of the noncon-
ceptual nature of consciousness in 
 
Pragmatism,
 
4
 
 pub-
lished seventeen years after 
 
The Principles of Psychology
 
and just three years before James’s death. This is James’s
most clearly epistemological work, where he considers,
for example, the relation between “reality” and “truth.”
Now it is “reality” under the heading of which James dis-
cusses a non-conceptual element, for James sees truths as
requiring concepts, which are human constructions:
“heirlooms” as he sees them, passed from one generation
to another. Reality, on the other hand, is simply “what
truths have to take account of.”   The greatest part of what
we have to take account of is the body of already accepted
truths, but, in keeping with the basic empiricism of his
entire oeuvre, James sees truths as ultimately anchored in
“the flux of our sensations.” Sensations are “forced upon
us, coming we know not whence. Over their nature,
order, and quantity we have as good as no control. 
 
They
 
are neither true or false; they simply 
 
are
 
” (
 
Pragmatism
 
, p.
117).
Now are these sensations conceptual? Merely saying
that they are not under our control does not mark them as
nonconceptual, for they may come to us in virtue of a fac-
ulty of receptivity—as McDowell
 
5
 
 puts it—that is never-
theless conceptual as well: “when we enjoy experience
conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity, not
exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of
receptivity” (
 
Mind and World
 
, p. 10). In the passage just
cited, James could well be agreeing with McDowell that
sensations 
 
are
 
 conceptualized, for he states they have a
“nature, order, and quantity.” It is this nature, one might
say, that permits true or false statements to be made
about them.
 In 
 
Pragmatism’s
 
 chapter on “Pragmatism and
Humanism,” however, James states that sensations are
“dumb.” “A sensation,” he states, “is rather like a client
who has given his case to a lawyer and then has passively
to listen in the courtroom to whatever account of his
affairs, pleasant or unpleasant, the lawyer finds it most
expedient to give” (
 
Pragmatism
 
, pp. 118-19). Although the
client may not speak, the metaphor suggests that the cli-
ent does have “affairs,” and “a case” —which must have a
conceptual shape or they would not be material for the
lawyer to work up or interpret. Returning from the meta-
phor to the facts of sensation, James again suggests that
we interpret something that has some particular charac-
ter: 
 
even in the field of sensation, our minds exert a certain
arbitrary choice. By our inclusions and omissions we
trace the field’s extent; by our emphasis we mark its fore-
ground and its background; by our order we read it in this
direction or that. We receive in short the block of marble,
but we carve the structure ourselves (
 
Pragmatism
 
, p.
118).
 
In most of this passage, James writes as if the field of
sensation has definite things in it—which may be omitted
or included, experienced as in the foreground or back-
ground, ordered in this way or that. But at the end, he
suggests that the sensational material, though it has a
nature, has no conceptual form. Despite his attraction to
the humanistic thesis that “the trail of the human serpent
 
4.
 
William James, 
 
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking
 
 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1975). Originally pub-
lished in 1907. Hereinafter cited as 
 
Pragmatism
 
.
 
5.
 
John M. McDowell, 
 
Mind and World
 
 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
U P, 1994)
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is over everything”— or as he also puts it, that “you can’t
escape the human touch”—James is also gripped by the
idea that sensation is not only in its origins but in its
nature beyond the human touch—and hence, perhaps,
beyond the conceptual altogether. 
According to James, the “fraction” of sensation that
comes “without the human touch...has immediately to
become humanized in the sense of being squared, assimi-
lated, or in ways adapted, to the humanized mass already
there.” The question is whether this fraction has a charac-
ter? Is there something about it that, like the client with
her specific case, lends itself to this or that interpretation?
Or is it more like the block of marble which has no form
at all until given one by the sculptor? “When we talk of
reality ‘independent’ of human thinking,” James states:
 
it seems a thing very hard to find. It reduces to the notion
of what is just entering into experience, and yet to be
named, or else to some imagined aboriginal presence in
experience, before any belief about the presence had
arisen, before any human conception had been applied. It
is what is absolutely dumb and evanescent, the merely
ideal limit of our minds. We may glimpse it, but we never
grasp it; what we grasp is always some substitute for it
which previous human thinking has peptonized and
cooked for our consumption (
 
Pragmatism
 
, pp. 119-120).
 
Notice, first, that the reality independent of human think-
ing is “very hard to find.” So it is not the same reality as
the state of “confusion” or “chaos” that, according to 
 
The
Principles
 
, we experience two or three times a day. That
would be “easy to find.” Second, James doesn’t even want
to say that he can find it the “reality ‘independent’ of
human thinking,”, for it is described as “evanescent,” per-
haps “imagined,” an “ideal limit.” Here in 
 
Pragmatism
 
, he
contrasts his position with that of those like Bergson who
think they can define or experience the “core” of reality
without its “man-made wrappings.” He is quite close to
Kant and McDowell here, for both of whom experience is
conceptualized “all the way down.” Indeed James appreci-
ates the relationship to Kant, if somewhat defensively, for
he writes that his position sounds “[s]uperficially...like
Kant’s view; but between categories fulminated before
nature began, and categories gradually forming them-
selves in nature’s presence, the whole chasm between
rationalism and empiricism yawns.” (
 
Pragmatism
 
, p.
120).
 
6
 
 This is to admit, however, that he posits something
like Kantian categories, and it is not far from James’s posi-
tion therefore to that of a Kantian pragmatist such as C. I.
Lewis, who posits empirically evolving a priori structures
to experience and knowledge.
 Much as he maintains his humanist position that
“you can’t escape the human touch,” however, James
does think an “aboriginal presence” exists in experience,
“before any human conception had been applied.” He
therefore falls on the wrong side (according to McDowell
anyway) of McDowell’s distinction between concepts as
drawn on in receptivity and concepts exercised on some
prior deliverance of receptivity. McDowell argues that a
mere causal relation between sensation and our beliefs,
rather than a conceptual relation within “the space of rea-
sons” or “space of concepts” ends by denying any 
 
justifi-
catory
 
 role to experience. James’s position is in this
respect like that of Donald Davidson, whom McDowell
criticizes for depicting “our empirical thinking as engaged
in with no rational constraint, but only causal influence,
from outside” (
 
Mind and World
 
, p. 14). It is open to James
to reply that he 
 
experiences
 
 a nonconceptualized given—
that the facts include such states of consciousness
whether they have a justificatory role or not. For McDow-
ell, judgment is central to experience, whereas for James
it is not.
 
3.
 
 I want next to consider some examples of the non-
conceptual in the “Mysticism” chapter of James’s 
 
Varieties
of Religious Experience
 
.
 
7
 
 According to James there are two
main characteristics of mystical experiences: ineffability
and a noetic or knowing quality. Regarding ineffability,
James states: “No one can make clear to another who has
never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of
it consists. One must have musical ears to know the value
of a symphony; one must have been in love one’s self to
understand a lover’s state of mind.” (
 
Varieties
 
, p. 343).
This is not the assertion that these experiences are non-
conceptual, only that they can’t be explained. Following a
line taken by McDowell, one might say that to have them
is to have at once a new concept, not a non-conceptual
experience. If one had never tasted coffee, for example,
one would not have the concept of coffee, except as a caf-
feinated drink that people typically take in the morning.
Once one tastes coffee, one “knows what it tastes like,”
and therefore has a different concept of coffee—the genu-
ine concept of coffee, one might want to say. Still, this is
not to posit a nonconceptual experience, but only perhaps
a conceptual experience one couldn’t explain satisfactorily
to someone who hasn’t had it (“it’s more like chocolate
than like lemon” and the like will take you only so far). In
this respect it is ineffable—perfectly definite, but inexpli-
cable to someone without the requisite sensitivity/experi-
ence.
Regarding the noetic quality of mystical experiences,
James states: “Although so similar to states of feeling,
mystical states seem to those who experience them to be
also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect.
They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance
and importance, all inarticulate though they remain;”
 
6.
 
A philosopher who closes the gap is C. I. Lewis. See for example
his “A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori,” 
 
The Journal of Phi-
losophy
 
, 1923, pp. 169-77.
 
7.
 
William James, 
 
The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in
Human Nature
 
 in 
 
William James, Writings 1902-1910 
 
(New York:
Library of America, 1987). Originally published in 1902. Hereinaf-
ter cited as 
 
Varieties
 
.
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James makes a claim about the nonconceptual in this last
sentence, for these states—and not just those who have
them—are said to be “inarticulate” and not knowable by
“the discursive” –i.e. separating or categorizing intellect.
Yet for all their nonconceptuality they are said to be, or at
least appear to be, states of knowledge. 
James finds that there are varieties of mystical experi-
ence, some of which are not even religious (
 
Varieties
 
, p.
370). There is, for example, the feeling of having been
somewhere before, which is a perfectly describable feel-
ing, accessible in some way even to someone who has not
had it. (
 
Varieties
 
, p. 345). There are the visions and senso-
rial images of Christian mysticism, which can be
described and reported to normal human beings. But the
preponderance of James’s examples are states in which
structure and articulation fall away. James cites J. A.
Symonds’ discussion of an abstract Self, “without form
and void of content” (
 
Varieties
 
, p. 347), St. John’s descrip-
tion of a state of “neither form nor impression” (
 
Varieties
 
,
p. 367), and states described by Buddhists, in which
“‘there are neither ideas nor absence of ideas.’” (
 
Varieties
 
,
p. 362).   
 
Varieties
 
 has a pragmatist side, according to which
the concepts that guide us profitably through the world
are ingredients in truths. But it also has the mystical side
we have been considering, in which James considers the
possibility of nonconceptual “knowledge.” 
 
8
 
 Such mystical
knowledge would neither be an “ideal limit” of experi-
ence, as in 
 
Pragmatism
 
, nor an original confused state to
which everyone reverts two or three times a day, as in 
 
The
Principles of Psychology
 
. In 
 
Varieties
 
, James reports on
those who claim to have such knowledge, but he does not
present himself as among them. Five years later, in lec-
tures given at Oxford on “The Present Situation in Philos-
ophy” and then published as 
 
A Pluralistic Universe
 
, James
is prepared to make claims to mystical knowledge, not in
special religious states, but in our ordinary life.
 
4. 
 
The nonconceptual becomes a fixation, a central
concern, in the last six years of James’s life: in his essays
on “radical empiricism,” and on Bradley and Bergson; and
in his two books: 
 
A Pluralistic Universe
 
9
 
 
 
and the posthu-
mously published 
 
Some Problems of Philosophy
 
10
 
. In these
works, to which we now turn, James harps on the follow-
ing themes:
1. There is a nonconceptual element in experience
that is widespread or ordinary. 
2. That element is known by a kind of acquaintance.
3. Conceptual knowledge is shallower than acquain-
tance. It is “merely pragmatic,” whereas acquaintance lets
us see into the life of things.
4. Nonconceptual knowledge cannot be described,
but it can be indicated or pointed to.
5. Nonconceptual knowledge 
 
can
 
 be described, as a
flow, confusion, profusion, particularity, animal life, the
full self, whole field, a “much-at-once.”
6. Concepts cut rather than synthesize.
7. Concepts are made out of the same material as per-
ception.
8. Philosophy should seek a return from a life in con-
cepts to a thicker life of intuition, empathy, and activity.
In 
 
A Pluralistic Universe
 
, James maintains that there
is a nonconceptual element not (just) in special states
such as states of vacant staring or mystical experiences,
but in all experiences, in the “distributed and strung-along
and flowing sort of reality which we finite beings swim in.
That is the sort of reality given us, and that is the sort with
which logic is so incommensurable.” (
 
Pluralistic
 
, p. 97).
James’s metaphors of flow recall the idea of “the stream of
thought” from 
 
The Principles of Psychology
 
. And just as in
that earlier work he had emphasized that water flows
between the areas of emphasis, so in these later works
James holds that “in the real concrete sensible flux of life
experiences copenetrate each other so that it is not easy
to know just what is excluded and what not.” (
 
Problems
 
, p.
114). 
Why is it that logic and its concepts are incommensu-
rable with this reality? At times James seems to hold sim-
ply that concepts are static and clear-cut, whereas reality
is intermingled, interpenetrated, and flowing. He writes,
for example that “the conceptual scheme, consisting as it
does of discontinuous terms, can only cover the percep-
tual flux in spots and incompletely” (
 
Problems
 
, p. 46).
Hence, the argument would seem to be, concepts cannot
describe reality because they do not share all its features.
But this would be to conflate description with substitution
or reproduction. It is like maintaining that I cannot say
that the light has turned green without producing some-
thing green. James does seem, sometimes, to make this
confusion.
 
11
 
 The question is whether James also has
something more interesting to say.
Logic is incommensurable with the flow of experi-
ence, James argues, because it uses concepts, and con-
cepts are retrospective snap-shots of a more complete and
active process. Here is a representative passage from the
chapter on “Bergson and Intellectualism” in 
 
A Pluralistic
Universe
 
:
 
What really 
 
exists
 
 is not things made but things in the
making. Once made, they are dead, and an infinite num-
ber of alternative conceptual decompositions can be used
in defining them. But put yourself 
 
in the making
 
 by a
 
8.
 
For the thesis that the pragmatic/mystical distinction is funda-
mental to James’s fundamental way of seeing things, see Richard
Gale, 
 
The Divided Self of William James
 
 (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge U P, 1999).
 
9.
 
William James, 
 
A Pluralistic Universe
 
 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
U P, 1977). Originally published in 1909. Hereinafter cited as 
 
Plu-
ralistic
 
.
10. William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard U P, 1979). Originally published in 1910. Hereinafter
cited as Problems.
11. Other bad arguments appear in Problems, p. 50, and Problems, p.
54. James confuses the “is” of predication with the “is” of identity.
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stroke of intuitive sympathy with the thing and, the whole
range of possible decompositions coming at once into
your possession, you are no longer troubled with the
question which of them is the more absolutely true. Real-
ity falls in passing into conceptual analysis; it mounts in
living its own undivided life—it buds and bourgeons,
changes and creates. Once adopt the movement of this
life in any given instance and you know what Bergson
calls the devenir réel by which the thing evolves and
grows. Philosophy should seek this kind of living under-
standing of the movement of reality, not follow science in
vainly patching together fragments of its dead results
(Pluralistic, pp. 117-18).
The major claims of A Pluralistic Universe, indeed of
much of his entire later philosophy, are expressed in this
passage. First, James asserts a metaphysics of process, a
metaphysics not of things but of things in the making.
Second, this “making” is in some way preconceptual,
offering a “range of possible decompositions into concep-
tual analysis,” but not actually decomposed into any of
them. The unity, one might say, has not yet been cut or
articulated; yet, tantalizingly, there is something about it
that fits it to be cut, that allows it to “fall” in various ways.
So James’s statements leave us with a by now familiar
Jamesian puzzle: how is it that we can understand the
range of possible decompositions and yet not be employ-
ing concepts in that understanding? Third, James holds
that reality is creative, growing, living. In his claim about a
budding, burgeoning life and in the contrast with the fro-
zen, dead concepts, we glimpse James’s romanticism.12
Fourth, James asserts that we can achieve a “living under-
standing” of reality, as opposed to the dead understanding
achieved in conceptual analysis and “science” (an exam-
ple of his characteristic ambivalence about science). Fifth,
James asserts that philosophers should seek such nonsci-
entific understanding.    
Why cannot concepts grasp the nonconceptual core
of reality? We briefly considered the unsatisfactory argu-
ment that simply because concepts are static, they cannot
grasp reality’s moving core. But James offers another,
less problematic, line of argument: that concepts, being
universal, cannot capture the particularity of a state of
affairs. Hilary Putnam13 considers this argument in his
paper, “James’s Theory of Perception.” Putnam reminds
us of James’s Darwinism, and that Darwinian species are
really evolving collections of individuals. Species, like
Jamesian concepts “slide into one another” (Realism with
a Human Face, p. 236). For a Darwinian, Putnam argues,
no two individuals are identical, so that although “there is
a ‘central tendency,’ this tendency is simply an average;
Darwin would say that it is a mere abstraction” (Realism
with a Human Face, p. 235). For Darwin, then, “the reality
is the variation,” not the kind. Does this explain, however,
why James thinks concepts are inadequate? If they don’t
capture the particular, why can’t we just create new con-
cepts? Perhaps the point is that if we did create new ones,
they would overwhelm us, and be useless to boot, for by
the nature of the particularity they would describe they
would have no further use (except to record our memo-
ries). Developing the point in this manner points not to
the falsity but to the limitations of conceptual description,
and it is along these lines that Putnam draws his conclu-
sion: “James wants to remind us that even though the
rationalistic type of thinking has its place—it is some-
times pragmatically effective—once it becomes one’s only
way of thinking, one is bound to lose the world for a beau-
tiful model.” (Realism with a Human Face, p. 236). 
Consider one of James’s most explicit treatments of
the particularity of perception, in Some Problems of Philos-
ophy. He writes: 
The percepts are singulars that change incessantly and
never return exactly as they were before. This brings an
element of concrete novelty into our experience. This
novelty finds no representation in the conceptual method,
for concepts are abstracted from experiences already seen
or given, and he who uses them to divine the new can
never do so but in ready-made and ancient terms.... Prop-
erly speaking, concepts are post-mortem preparations,
sufficient only for retrospective understanding; and when
we use them to define the universe prospectively we
ought to realize that they can give only a bare abstract
outline or approximate sketch, in the filling out of which
perception must be invoked (Problems, p. 54).
James thus proposes two answers to the question of
what concepts miss: flux and particularity. A third answer
to the question is: a set of possibilities and vague feelings
that are always part of our experience, an answer James
offers in A Pluralistic Universe:
My present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded
by a fringe that shades insensibly into a subconscious
more. I use three separate terms here to describe this fact;
but I might as well use three hundred, for the fact is all
shades and no boundaries.... What we conceptually iden-
tify ourselves with and say we are thinking of at any time
is the centre; but our full self is the whole field, with all
those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of
increase that we can only feel without conceiving; and
can hardly begin to analyze (Problems, p. 130).
The metaphors of the field and the fringe originally
appear in The Principles of Psychology, where they articu-
late the depths of the stream of thought. The stream is not
one-dimensional and not uniform in clarity. The back-
ground, the fringes are “vague,” and it is “the reinstate-
ment of the vague to its proper place in an account of
human nature” that James identifies as one of his tasks.
However, James does not claim in the Principles that the
12. Cf. my American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge U P, 1990), Chapter 3.
13. Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard U P, 1990).
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background of thought is less conceptual than the fore-
ground. 
James’s account continues with a discussion of the
power concepts bring. It is, he writes,
no wonder that earlier thinkers, forgetting that concepts
are only man-made extracts from the temporal flux,
should have ended by treating them as a superior type of
being, bright, changeless, true, divine, and utterly
opposed in nature to the turbid, restless lower world....
Intellectualism in the vicious sense began when Socrates
and Plato taught that what a thing really is, is told us by
its definition” (Pluralistic, pp. 98-99).
In distinction from his position in Pragmatism, where the
nonconceptual was a “vanishing” “ideal,” here the noncon-
ceptual becomes a desired goal, and James waffles on
whether sympathetic understanding of the nonconceptual
is superior to or coequal with the conceptual understand-
ing explored by pragmatism. 
James tells a story of alienation and oppression, in
which the useful practice of conceptual understanding
becomes a “method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny
that defeats the end it was used for” (Pluralistic, p. 99). He
calls for a return of our lives and thought from the power-
ful abstractions of the intellect to the sympathetic under-
standing of the “turbid” and “restless” “temporal flux.”
When he is in a more evenhanded mood, he calls for a
proper balance between the two, a position that Ralph
Barton Perry14 sees as the final view of both Bergson and
James: “James and Bergson agree, as against Peirce and
Dewey, in assigning a cognitive role both to concepts and
to immediate experience” (Thought and Character, p.
602). 
5. I now want to consider Some Problems of Philoso-
phy, a book James was bringing to completion when he
died in 1910., and to begin with a thesis we have not yet
discussed (although it is present in A Pluralistic Universe
as well): that concepts and percepts are made of “the
same kind of stuff.” James writes:
Concepts and percepts are consubstantial. I mean by this
that they are made of the same kind of stuff, and melt into
each other when we handle them together. How could it
be otherwise when the concepts are like evaporations out
of the bosom of perception, into which they condense
again whenever practical service summons them? No one
can tell, of the thing he now holds in his hand and reads,
how much comes in through his eyes and fingers, and
how much, from his apperceiving intellect, unites with
that and makes of it this particular ‘book’.... The world
we practically live in is one in which it is impossible
(except by theoretic retrospection) to disentangle the con-
tributions of intellect from those of sense. They are wrapt
and rolled together as a gunshot in the mountains is wrapt
and rolled in fold on fold of echo and reverberative
clamor. Even so do intellectual reverberations enlarge
and prolong the perceptual experience which they enve-
lope, associating it with remoter parts of existence. And
the ideas of these in turn work like those resonators that
pick out partial tones in complex sounds. They help us to
decompose our percept into parts and to abstract and iso-
late its elements.
The two mental functions thus play into each other’s
hands. Perception awakens thought, and thought in turn
enriches perception. The more we see, the more we think;
while the more we think, the more we see in our immedi-
ate experiences, and the greater grows the detail, and the
more significant the articulateness of our perception”
(Problems, pp. 58-59).
James’s position here is reminiscent in some respects
of Pragmatism, for he holds that we cannot distinguish a
pure nonconceptual element in experience. He continues
to hold that experience consists of a mixture of our con-
cepts and something else, but here the “something else”
is apprehended not by sympathetic intuition, but by “per-
ception,” for example, through our “eyes and fingers.”
Indeed he sounds a Humean note in holding that con-
cepts are “like evaporations out of the bosom of percep-
tion.” They are derivative, therefore, and much less
substantial—or as Hume says, they are “faint.” It is here
that James’s position is most unsatisfactory, for along with
Hume and others in the sensationalist tradition of British
empiricism, James offers no account of the normativity of
concepts, and so, it may be maintained, no real account of
thought or concepts at all.15 
James’s claim that concepts and percepts are consub-
stantial can be taken in two ways: the empiricist way of
saying that concepts are faint echoes and gatherings of
essentially non conceptual material; but also the Kantian,
rationalist way of regarding both concepts and percepts as
in some sense “conceptual.”   And James seems to take
the claim in a more Kantian direction when he speaks of
intellectual reverberations enlarging and prolonging the
perceptual experiences they envelope, and associating
those experiences with “remoter parts of existence.” For
it would seem that it must be in virtue of some character
or features of those perceptual experiences that such
associations, enlargings and prolongings are established.
However, James does not draw this conclusion. For he
continues to think that because experience is undivided it
cannot be “conceptual.” His position, we can now see, is
another version of the statements about “interpenetration
and melting” in his discussion of the stream of thought
twenty years earlier. Indeed, in the key passage from
Some Problems of Philosophy to which I now turn, he
14. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William
James, as Revealed in Unpublished Correspondence and Notes,
Together with His Published Writings (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1935). Hereinafter cited as Thought and Character.
15. See my discussion in Wittgenstein and William James. Cf Thomas
Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1997).
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revives his earlier discussion of the “blooming, buzzing,
confusion”: 
The great difference between percepts and concepts is
that percepts are continuous and concepts are discrete.
Not discrete in their being, for conception as an act is part
of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their
several meanings....The perceptual flux as such...means
nothing, and is what it immediately is; and no matter how
small a tract of it be taken, it is always a much-at-once,
and contains innumerable aspects and characters which
conception can pick out and isolate, and thereafter always
intend. It shows duration, intensity, complexity or sim-
plicity, interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness, or
their opposites. Data from all our senses enter into it
(Problems, p. 32).
One may well again think that James is not talking about
the nonconceptual at all, since the flux or “much-at-once”
contains all these “aspects” and “characters.” James is
thinking the flux is nonconceptual for two reasons: 1) the
characters in the flux bleed into each other, whereas con-
cepts are distinct; 2) the characters’ much-at-onceness
amounts to a confusion or chaos that is incompatible with
the orderliness of conceptual experience. This becomes
clear as the passage continues:
Yet all these parts leave its unity unbroken. Its bound-
aries are no more distinct than are those of the field of
vision. Boundaries are things that intervene; but here
nothing intervenes save parts of the perceptual flux itself,
and these are overflowed by what they separate, so that
whatever we distinguish and isolate conceptually is found
perceptually to telescope and compenetrate and diffuse
into its neighbors. The cuts we make are purely ideal. If
my reader can succeed in abstracting from all conceptual
interpretation and lapse back into his immediate sensible
life at this very moment, he will find it to be what some-
one has called a big blooming buzzing confusion, as free
from contradiction in its ‘much-at-onceness’ as it is all
alive and evidently there (Problems, p. 32).
James not only returns (with a curious loss of memory) to
his metaphor of the blooming buzzing confusion, but to
the claim of The Principles of Psychology (and A Pluralistic
Universe) that we can avail ourselves of the nonconceptual
by returning (“lapse back”) to a state of absorption in our
“immediate sensible life.” Unlike the “cuts” we make, the
confusion is “free of contradiction,” intensely “alive.” We
again encounter James’s Romanticism here, and are
reminded of Wordsworth’s claim in “The Tables Turned,”
where he writes that “Our meddling intellect Mis-shapes
the beauteous forms of things;-- We murder to dissect.”
James is of two minds about this dissection or cut-
ting. As a pragmatist, he finds it useful, but as a “radical
empiricist” and as a “mystic” or “Romantic” he finds this
cutting to obscure rather than reveal nature: “Conceptual
knowledge is forever inadequate to the fulness of the real-
ity to be known” (Problems, p. 45). Here again we encoun-
ter what Gale calls “the divided self of William James.”
One question that will occur to many of you is
whether all this talk of the nonconceptual is not just
that—talk, using concepts.   James’s practice, it may be
alleged, shows his own commitment to the superiority or
ineliminability of the conceptual for determining truth.
The point may be illustrated with the standard empiricist
example of “blue,” which for James as for Hume is a qual-
ity that cannot be known to someone who cannot see—
grasping the concept “blue” presupposes the experience
of blue. The illustration raises a further question, how-
ever: to what degree is James’s point about the noncon-
ceptual merely a reformulation of his empiricist
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by
description that he had formulated twenty years earlier in
The Principles of Psychology, where he writes:
I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a
pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my fin-
ger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an
effort of attention when I make it; a difference between
two things when I notice it; but about the inner nature of
these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say
nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to
anyone who has not already made it himself. I cannot
describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like,
define to a child a syllogism, [curious example, RG] or
tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just
what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At
most, I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act
in certain ways, and these objects will probably come. All
the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera,
the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the
kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either
not be known at all, or known in this dumb way of
acquaintance without knowledge-about (Principles, p.
217).
We are reminded of the “dumb” client of Pragmatism,
who had to listen to his conceptual attorney make his
case. Notice that, as in Pragmatism, there is a case to be
made, for James writes of “qualities” and “relations” being
known in this “dumb way of acquaintance.”   Acquain-
tance shows us differences—as sharp as that between
blue and yellow. How can these not be (to some degree)
conceptual? Are concepts not, as James will say in Some
Problems, already present in some fashion in “the bosom
of perception”? 
6. One might feel at this point that in James’s many
remarks about the nonconceptual we are confronted with
a veritable blooming, buzzing profusion or confusion of
doctrines and questions. Let us take stock.
First, James uses the idea of something that escapes
or precedes concepts in at least four ways: 
1) in his empiricism, both in The Principles of Psychol-
ogy and in such late works as Some Problems of Philosophy,
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where James asserts a nonconceptual, sensational core of
experience;
2) in his Bergsonian mysticism, where he asserts the
existence of a living flux known by sympathetic intuition;
3) in his discussions of religious experience, where
nonconceptual states appear as some of our most pro-
found encounters with reality but are not available to
everyone; 
4) in The Principles of Psychology, where nonconcep-
tual states are both the standard experience of babies, and
a particular state of distraction or vacancy that adults
enter two or three times a day. 
Notice that 4) and 3) clash with 1), for 1) claims that
the nonconceptual exists in normal empirical experience,
and 4) and 3) take it to be a special or unusual experience.
Notice also that the issues raised by the nonconcep-
tual are both metaphysical and epistemological: James
tells us different if related stories both about what the
nonconceptual is (sensation, the elan vital, devenir réel),
and about how we know what it is (perception, sympa-
thetic intuition). 
Finally, James offers a variety of characterizations of
the nonconceptual: as a flux, particularity, living reality, a
much-at-once, a confused, blooming, buzzing unity. The
conceptual is just the reverse in each case: static, abstract
or ideal, dead, partial. In this fundamental distinction,
James shows his allegiance both to empiricism and to
romanticism.
I conclude with some questions raised by the preced-
ing discussion:
1) Does James have one basic narrative, consistent
position all the way from Principles onwards? Is it a basic
insight that he keeps refining or a succession of related
doctrines? To what degree is James’s position merely a
version of his distinction between knowledge by acquain-
tance and by description? 
2) In considering McDowell’s criticisms of a noncon-
ceptual given element in experience, would James be able
to successfully argue that he is not interested mostly in
justification but in experience, and if experience contains
the nonconceptual so much the worse for a structure of
justification? Would James wish to maintain that McDow-
ell offers an over intellectualized account of knowledge?
How much of James’s position is in fact compatible with
McDowell’s conceptually loaded empiricism?
3) To what degree is the idea of reception in romantic
writers such as Emerson and Wordsworth (as in Word-
sworth’s injunction to “bring with you a heart that
watches and receives”) a mode of the nonconceptual and
to what degree a different mode or inflection of the con-
ceptual? And how is it related to Jamesian/Bergsonian
ideas of “sympathetic intuition”?16 I hope these questions
invite or elicit further thought about the intriguing philos-
ophy of William James.17
—Russell Goodman is a professor of philosophy at the
University of New Mexico. He was the keynote speaker at the
Fourth Annual Donald G. Wester Philosophy Conference in
2004, and this essay was the keynote address. He is author
of Wittgenstein and William James (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge U P, 2002). E-mail = rgoodman@unm.edu
16. Thanks to Sandra Laugier for this suggestion, and for the invita-
tion to present this paper in Amiens at the Université de Picardie
Jules Verne.
17. An earlier version of this paper appears in the special issue of
Midwest Studies in Philosophy devoted to American Philosophy
(2004). This version of the paper is published with the permis-
sion of Midwest Studies.
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Reading Material: William 
James and the Language of 
Consciousness
 
by Raphael C. Allison
 
I was first drawn to the topic of William James’s liter-
ary style and the forms of attention and consciousness it
provokes by the way his metaphorical examples often per-
form, rather than represent, their subjects. A case most
likely familiar to all is the description of “dried human
heads” James uses to depict an “empiricist universe” in “A
World of Pure Experience.” “The skull,” he says, “forms a
solid nucleus; but innumerable feathers, leaves, strings,
beads, and loose appendices of every description float and
dangle from it, and, save that they terminate in it, seem to
have nothing to do with one another.”
 
1
 
 How perfectly this
metaphor mediates its subject: dangling grotesquely from
an essay in academic philosophy, the image of a shriveled
head “floats” in alienation from its terminal object much
like the trinkets and “loose appendices” surrounding the
skull appear alienated from the human consciousness
once lodged within. The metaphor thus dramatizes the
pluralism of “pure experience” for readers who are forced
to grapple with the image’s unexpectedness. 
In 
 
Pragmatism
 
, James illustrates his discussion of
“possibles” with a “concretely possible chicken.”
 
2
 
 The del-
icacies of his argument are not important here. But the
calculated effects of the phrase “possible chicken” are,
especially since it is succeeded by the portentousness of
the following sentence: “Let us apply this notion to the sal-
vation of the world” (P 128). By juxtaposing chickens and
salvation James generates a discordant effect that condi-
tions readers to perspicacity: beyond simply assenting to
(or dissenting from) this argument, one also can’t help
questioning the relationship between fowls and human
fate. The incongruity coaches us to carefully regard terms
of argument; we read ahead engaged by the proposition
that the pluralist entanglements sponsored by pragma-
tism must be met on the very grounds of their fabrication.
There are other examples, like a description of
George Santayana’s literary style as the “cooling spray” of
“nose disinfectant from an atomizer.”
 
3
 
 James even theo-
rized upon them, as in this passage from 
 
Principles of Psy-
chology
 
:
 
4
 
Usually the vague perception that all the words we hear
belong to the same language and to the same special
vocabulary in that language, and that the grammatical
sequence is familiar, is practically equivalent to an
admission that what we hear is sense. But if an unusual
foreign word be introduced, if the grammar trip, or if a
term from an incongruous vocabulary suddenly appear,
such as ‘rat-trap’ or ‘plumber’s bill’ in a philosophical
discourse, the sentence detonates, as it were, we receive a
shock from the incongruity, and the drowsy assent is
gone (
 
Principles
 
, p. 253).
 
Shrunken heads, possible chickens, and atomized nose-
spray—not to mention rat-traps and plumber’s bills—
serve to pluralize philosophical discourse by “shocking”
readers from their nodding consents. They perform this
work, rather than report it. 
This is a reliable, if limited way to read James’s use of
outré metaphor. James regularly deployed estrangements
of language to combat readerly enervation and to foster
what Jonathan Levin has called James’s “metaphorics of
transition,” the reader’s sense of “haloes” and “penum-
bras” of, as Levin explains, “the thing-itself-in-transition,
its new form being created with reference to its past forms
and in anticipation of its unfolding future forms.”
 
5
 
 Ideally,
tropes draw readers to brinks and edges of not only dis-
course, but consciousness itself by courting liminal expe-
riences that constitute intellectual renewal. “It is, in short,
the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our
mental life which I am so anxious to press on the atten-
tion,” James famously says in 
 
Principles
 
. The difficulties
involved in grappling with figurative, or even strange lan-
guage foster transitional dissociations. “The significance,
the value, of the image,” James says, “is all in this halo or
penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,” not in the image
itself (
 
Principles
 
, p. 246).    
Having validated this argument, I would like to sug-
gest something a little different about James’s use of
tropes, as well as language itself. According to the above
narrative, figures of speech play a liberating role, cracking
the procrustean hold of ossified, intellectualized form.
This narrative follows a modernist myth of emancipatory
contingency and renewal, for which James has historically
been such an accommodating figure. “With Nietzsche and
Emerson, and in anticipation of Foucault and Deleuze,”
argues Richard Poirier, “James was essentially trying to
release himself and the rest of us from any settled, coher-
ent idea of the human, from the conceptual systems and
arrangements of knowledge by which man has so far
defined himself. In his work and in his life, he was drawn
to the marginal, the transgressive.”
 
6
 
 This suits the
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description above, yet as an emancipatory model it fails to
recognize how deeply suspicious and despairing James
was of tropes, not to mention language itself. For James’s
language often reveals a mind struggling within the con-
fines of its medium of exchange. By harboring a linguistic
skepticism, James wasn’t necessarily “releasing himself”
from the demands of logocentrism; he was confronting
the inarticulate nature of consciousness itself. 
For example, here is James referring to a series of
tropes to describe the persistence of habit in a passage
from 
 
Principles
 
: “A lock works better after being used
some time”; “It costs less trouble to fold a paper when it
has been folded already”; “The sounds of a violin improve
by use in the hands of an able artist”; “Water, in flowing,
hollows out for itself a channel, which grows broader and
deeper”; “A scar anywhere is...more liable to be abraded”
(
 
Principles
 
, pp. 110-111). As this swelling replication of
analogies suggests, metaphors are insufficient for repre-
senting habitual experience, which remains silent and
ineffable behind this welter of comparison. James com-
ments: “our usual scientific custom of interpreting hidden
molecular events after the analogy of visible massive ones
enables us to frame easily an abstract and general scheme
of processes which the physical changes in question 
 
may
 
be like” (
 
Principles
 
, p. 112). 
 
May
 
 be like, but not necessar-
ily 
 
will
 
 be like. This isn’t liberating. It’s frustrating. 
In this counter-narrative, then, James’s attempts to
“liberate” sclerotic consciousness through figures of
speech are in turn freighted with doubt and frustration
over the restrictions imposed by the liberating medium.
While figurative language may presage liminal forms of
cognizance, it is also an index to the poverty of speech in
the face of a fuller practice. Tropes, and eventually lan-
guage itself, provide the landscape on which these anxi-
eties are mapped. To be locked within the dictates of a
linguistic framework creates maddeningly finite restric-
tions on consciousness.
One way to frame this problem is with James’s antag-
onistic relationship to the English language. A letter to his
parents from Germany shows him ruminating on the
“wonderful impression of the strange difference between
the whole German way of thinking and ours,” one which
 
seems to be connected with the grammatical structure of
the sentences...the expression corresponds much more
closely to the   spontaneous and impromptu mode of
thought than in our Latinized tongues.... As soon as the
first glimmering of an idea has dawned upon you, there is
no reason why you should not begin to inscribe.... While
with us you will, as a rule, come to grief if you begin your
sentence without a pretty distinct idea of word-multipli-
cation by composition. In English one is forced “to fix in
a most homely, pregnant form, a host of evanescent
shades of meaning...as fast as they flash upon the mind”
(
 
Letters1
 
, pp. 87-88).
 
This early letter anticipates his later, more rarefied
theories of linguistic flux, like that found in his 1905 essay
“The Thing and Its Relations,” in which “conjunctive”
words like “‘in,’ ‘on,’ ‘beside,’ ‘between,’ ‘next,’ like’”
rather than “fixed” or “substantive” nouns cleave more
faithfully to the streaming holism of radical empiricism
(
 
ERE
 
, p. 95). In the above letter, English itself embodies
that problematically substantive drive toward “fixing”
more “evanescent shades.”
This sentiment gets replicated throughout 
 
Principles
 
.
Here James complains about the lack of English declen-
sion as compared to Greek and Latin: 
 
Names did not appear in them inalterable, but changed
their shape to suit the context in which they lay. It must
have been easier then than now to conceive of the same
object as being thought of at different times in non-identi-
cal conscious states (
 
Principles
 
, p. 230).
 
Most often, James depicts language as a blunted instru-
ment that fails the bearer’s requirements: “our psycholog-
ical vocabulary is wholly inadequate to name the
differences that exist” (
 
Principles
 
, p. 243), he complains.
Or he concludes, “large tracts of human speech are noth-
ing but 
 
signs of direction
 
 in thought, of which direction we
nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense” (
 
Prin-
ciples
 
, p. 244). Tropes, it seems, are not his only concern.
It should be no great surprise that James harbored
such conflicted skepticism, or that these anxieties would
surface during moments of linguistic stress, as with trope
use. James’s style is perhaps best known for its figurative
sumptuousness, and the question of the effectiveness of
figurative language, not to mention James’s attitude
toward it, has been raised and left profitably unsettled
before. Thus I want to demarcate one specific cluster of
associations James sustained in regards to this problem
as a way to better understand the nature, rather than the
fact of this skepticism. Throughout his career James
dwelt on the failures of language in the contrasting terms
of materiality versus immateriality, the seen and the
unseen, the “thing” and its aura. That is, the material or
thing-like quality of language conflicts with the immate-
rial, “auratic” consciousness that provokes it. Thus James
articulates this problem of language in agonistic terms of
solid, material forms groping after the un-quantifiable,
diaphanous fringe. And this problem was associated with
the act of reading itself, for reading stages the encounter
between material instantiations of language (texts) and
the mental or oral rendering of that material. The act of
reading de-materializes text, transforming a series of
marks on paper into spoken words, and in doing so sug-
gests the very problem of language James is so concerned
with throughout his career. 
We’ve already seen the dyad of concrete/abstract in
James’s mention of metaphor’s failure to describe “hidden
molecular events after the analogy of visible massive
ones.” The primal scene of this linguistic materialism
derives from a passage in 
 
Principles
 
 in which he describes
a three-dimensional model to illustrate the correspon-
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dence between the duration of a word’s existence in
speech and its effect on the conscious mind:
 
If we make a solid wooden frame with the sentence writ-
ten on its front, and a time-scale on one of its sides, if we
spread flatly a sheet of India rubber over its top, on which
rectangular co-ordinates are painted, and slide a smooth
ball under the rubber in the direction from 0 to ‘yester-
day,’ the bulging of the membrane along this diagonal at
successive moments will symbolize the changing of the
thought’s content in a way plain enough (
 
Principles
 
, pp.
272-273).
 
The example of this physical model goes out of its way to
emphasize its tactile qualities, including the “wooden
frame,” “a sheet of India rubber,” and the “smooth ball”
and “membrane” of its surface. Graphing speech patterns
in three solid dimensions thus offers a schematic repre-
sentation of the spoken life of language, and suggests how
a mind may “ride,” or even “surf” the wave-crest of
speech. More importantly, it catches James at a material-
ist paradox, employing a metaphor of “solid wood” to rep-
resent the transitory nature of speech and consciousness.
That is, at the moment of promoting the immaterial, tran-
sitive nature of speech he resorts (or clings?) to the con-
crete substance of wood, paint, and India rubber.
 This paradoxical drive to represent the ephemeral in
concrete form recurs in the cognitive dissonance saturat-
ing the following passage from a letter to Henry. The let-
ter is inflected with a sense of the link between the act of
reading and this materialist paradox:
 
You know how opposed your whole ‘third manner’ of
execution is to the literary ideals which animate my crude
and Orson-like breast, mine being to say a thing in one
sentence as straight and explicit as it can be made, and
then to drop it forever; yours being to avoid naming it
straight, but by dint of breathing and sighing all round
and round it, to arouse in the reader who may have had a
similar perception already...the illusion of a solid object,
made wholly out of impalpable materials, air, and the
prismatic interferences of light, ingeniously focused by
mirrors upon empty space.... As air, by dint of its volume,
will weigh like a corporeal body (
 
Letters2
 
, pp. 277-278).
 
This passage marks an important conflation of reading
activity—the moment of physical engagement with lan-
guage while reading Henry’s trope-laden texts—and the
anxiety of disjunction between the material and the imma-
terial, the experience and the word. It is as if reading
Henry’s prose has animated William’s conflict between
“solid objects” and “impalpable materials.” What is the
connection? That by writing down, or materializing
“empty space,” Henry risks destroying it; that textualizing
experience means “turning substantive,” as it were. The
act of reading discloses the nature of linguistic disappoint-
ment, its grasping nature and its imminent failure, and
James articulates this frustration 
 
with
 
 language by refer-
ence to acts 
 
of
 
 language. A straight line may be drawn
between the wooden block in 
 
Principles
 
 and the letter to
Henry above. 
This phenomenon has deeper roots in 
 
Principles
 
, as
when James describes reading as directly related to mem-
ory and cognition in the story of the “statesman” who told
James “that a certain hesitation in utterance which he has
at times, is due to his being plagued by the image of his
manuscript speech with its original erasures and correc-
tions” (
 
Principles
 
, p. 702); or in the historical anecdote
James relates of one Colonel Moncrieff, in which Ameri-
can Indians “who, visiting occasionally his quarters, inter-
ested themselves greatly in the engravings which were
shown them. One of them followed with care with the
point of his knife the outline of a drawing in the Illustrated
London News, saying that this was to enable him to carve
it out the better on his return home” (
 
Principles
 
, p. 708).
In such narratives, physical texts take on a totemic signifi-
cance both awesome and debilitating: because of the hard
facts of text, the statesman is reduced to yammers, the
Native American to a condescending anthropologist’s
gaze. Scenes of reading like these dramatize the aspira-
tions and subsequent failures of speech, the text itself
haunting full articulation by its deceptive solidity. 
As a way of finishing off this rather large and
unwieldy topic, let me try to say more precisely what 
 
I
 
mean. In his third Gifford lecture, called “The Reality of
the Unseen,”
 
7
 
 James suggests that there is a “sense” of an
“unseen” reality so plangent and powerful that it cannot
be apprehended by the senses or by normal routes of
logic. Those who experience this phenomenon are
“haunted” and “diffused” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 63) with a “sense” of
what they eventually term “spirit” or “God,” or “a con-
sciousness of a presence” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 59). Many of the anec-
dotes James cites are marked by frustration with an
inability to say exactly what the authors mean. “[T]he
more I seek words to express this intimate intercourse,
the more I feel the impossibility of describing the thing by
any of our usual images,” complains one (
 
VRE
 
, p. 68). “It
is impossible fully to describe the [religious] experience,”
avers another (
 
VRE
 
, p. 66). Language fails ineffable con-
sciousness. 
The narrators of such inarticulate certainties further
characterize their experiences as catalyzed by reading.
Their encounters are, that is, textual in nature. One says
such an experience occurred while, as he describes it,
“my mind was absorbed in some lectures which I was pre-
paring; and I was still absorbed in these when I became
aware of the actual presence...of the thing that was there”
(
 
VRE
 
, p. 60). The same writer relates another such experi-
ence in ways similar to Jamesian vagueness, yet these
vagaries are attached to something palpably “sure.” It was
“[n]ot vague either,” the writer says of his apparition, “not
like the emotional effect of some poem, or scene...but the
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sure knowledge of the close presence of a sort of mighty
person” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 60). In both instances, this writer finds a
direct analog for the toggle between the “vague” and the
“sure,” “concrete” and “immaterial,” in comparisons to
taking notes and reading poems—textual experiences, all.
These experiences attain so well they obliterate the dis-
tinction between matter and ephemera: “something was
present with me,” he says, “and I knew its presence far
more surely than I have ever known the presence of any
fleshly living creature” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 60). Bizarrely, the convic-
tion of “reality” or “presence” is made more “real” by its
inexpressible, “unreal” nature.
Most writers James chose for this lecture deploy sim-
ilar narratives, all of them yoking the act of reading and/
or writing to the experience of a definite, virtually mate-
rial—but maddeningly ineffable—presence, much like his
own experience with Henry’s novels. “I had read...some
twenty minutes or so,” begins one, “was thoroughly
absorbed in the book...and I was aware, with an intense-
ness not easily imagined...that another being or presence
was not only in the room, but quite close to me. I put my
book down” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 61). Another, directly after she “read
the Bible,” felt that “the plan of salvation flashed upon
her” so strongly it was “almost like talking with God”
(
 
VRE
 
, p. 69). One such witness describes himself 
 
as
 
 a vir-
tual text, so enlightened that God’s “laws [are] written in
my body and mind” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 70).
What to these many examples reveal? For one thing,
reading and writing seem to provoke, not reflect, crises of
definition for James. Working with language seems to cre-
ate for him a simultaneous and coextensive mingling of
the vague and distinct, the concrete and abstract. It does
not serve liberating vagueness; rather, rendering texts
into language dramatizes the sustaining agon between
language and consciousness, and James’s continual strug-
gle to perform the work of knowing. For all his effective
tropes and belief in “conjunctive” relations to reach the
transformative outskirts of consciousness, James also felt
a competing frustration over linguistic limitation, and his
unresolved skepticism over verbal collapse froths over
precisely at the most intense moments of readerly
engagement. This may in the end simply indicate a liter-
ary provenance for James’s concerns over ineffability and
articulation, over the “vague,” the “substantive” and “con-
junctive,” “material” and “immaterial” nature of thought,
and the haunting traditions of indeterminate experi-
ences—religious, mystical, hallucinogenic, neurasthenic,
etc.—that lead to palpable realities. It may be, in other
words, that language not only provides James a medium
for working through consciousness and experience; lan-
guage may actually help to create these forms of attention
in the first place.
 
—Raphael C. Allison is an assistant professor of
English literature in Bard College’s Masters of Arts in
Teaching program. E-mail=allison@bard.edu
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1.
 
 
 
Play Longing and Real Longing: 
An Introduction
 
At §726 of the 
 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychol-
ogy
 
, Volume 1,
 
1
 
 Wittgenstein writes:
 
...one might very well say of someone who plays longing
on the stage of a theatre, that he experiences, or has, a
picture of longing: for this is not given as an 
 
explanation
 
of his proceedings, but as part of a description.
 
Wittgenstein is saying here that one might say that the
actor has in his mind a picture of what it is like to long,
and, in his office as an actor, he gives animation to this
picture on stage. This picturing in the mind of what it is
like to long is not the explanation for his carrying out the
longing on stage. Rather, it is a part of the description of
what he does when he acts.
Suggesting that the behavior of the actor can be
described more robustly than the conjunction of private
picturing and public playing, Wittgenstein then asks:
 
But wouldn’t I say that the actor does experience some-
thing like real longing? For isn’t there something in what
James says: that the emotion consists in the bodily feel-
ings, and hence can be at least partially reproduced by
voluntary movements (
 
RPP1
 
, §727)?
 
In this paper, these questions about the actor serve as
motivation toward an investigation into the accounts of
emotions provided by both James and Wittgenstein. Spe-
cifically, I will be concerned with what James and Wit-
tgenstein have to say about the relation between emotions
and the body. Upon examination of James’s 
 
The
 
 
 
Principles
of Psychology
 
2
 
 (the text with which Wittgenstein was famil-
iar) and Wittgenstein’s 
 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psy-
chology
 
, I will argue that there is indeed for Wittgenstein
“something in what James says.” However, I will also
claim that for Wittgenstein, there are important features
of emotions about which James misspeaks or is alto-
gether silent. Finally, I will contend that James is able to
subvert at least some of Wittgenstein’s criticisms with
remarks that he makes in his later 
 
The Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience
 
.
 
2. Locating Wittgenstein’s Feelings about 
James’s Theory of Emotions
 
According to James, “Common sense says, we lose
our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are
frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry
and strike” (
 
PP
 
, p. 1066). James suggests that this
sequence of events is incorrect; in actuality, we feel sorry
because we weep; we are frightened because we run; we
are angry because we strike. This sequence is consonant
with what one may properly call his theory of emotions:
 
...that the bodily changes follow directly the perception
of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same
changes as they occur is the emotion (
 
PP
 
, p. 1065).
 
James has no qualms about admitting that his theory
is “sure to meet with immediate disbelief” (
 
PP
 
, p. 1066).
Wittgenstein, however, is one reader who does not appear
to be instantly repelled by the theory. In this section, I will
try to determine what aspects of James’s theory Wittgen-
stein appreciated, as well as those about which he had res-
ervations.
 
2.1
 
 
 
Feeling Fear and Sensing Pain
 
It is counterintuitive, to be sure, to think that one is
sad because one cries and not vice versa. Such a theory
seems susceptible to charges of incoherence; however,
Malcolm Budd cites the following passage from the
 
Brown Book
 
, in which Wittgenstein seems sympathetic to
James’s theory: 
 
Remember at this point that the personal experiences of
any emotion must in part be strictly localized experi-
ences; for if I frown in anger I feel the muscular tension
of the frown in my forehead, and if I weep, the sensations
around my eyes are obviously part, and an important part,
of what I feel. This is, I think, what William James meant
when he said that a man doesn’t cry because he is sad but
that he is sad because he cries (Wittgenstein, 
 
Brown
Book
 
, §103).
 
 3
 
Indeed, it seems that James meant something like
this. In support of his claim that nothing remains when
the feelings of the bodily symptoms of an emotion are
abstracted from the emotion, James makes the following
commentary regarding the feeling of rage. It appears
largely consistent with Wittgenstein’s above commentary
on anger:
 
Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition
in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the
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nostrils, no clenching of the teeth..., but in their stead
limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The
present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as
completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called
manifestations... (
 
PP
 
, pp. 1067-1068).
 
James and Wittgenstein seem to agree that the feel-
ing of emotions such as anger is at least partly composed
of bodily sensations. The two disagree, however, as to the
extent of this composition. Wittgenstein holds that the
muscular tension in his forehead when he frowns is 
 
part
 
of the experience of anger. One can imagine abstracting
this localized feeling and still have some part of the emo-
tion “left over.” James states that rage is 
 
evaporated
 
 with
the loss of the sensations of its bodily manifestations. This
remark suggests that no part of the emotion is “left over”
after abstracting the localized feelings that occur when
one is in rage. A commitment to such a suggestion is
apparent upon consideration of this statement of James’s,
which he describes as the “vital point” of his theory:
 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract
from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily
symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no
‘mind-stuff’ out of which an emotion can be constituted,
and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual percep-
tions is all that remains (
 
PP
 
, p. 1067).
 
Indeed, James is claiming here that a localized feeling just
 
is
 
 the emotion. Here, then, is one point of contention
between James and Wittgenstein. 
As Budd points out, “feeling” is a prime example of
“an everyday psychological concept...of an indefinite
nature, accommodating phenomena of radically different
kinds” (
 
Budd
 
, p. 146). One feels determined, one feels as
if one has seen that person here before, one feels dis-
traught, and one feels a pain in one’s stomach. There are
many sorts of “feelings,” each quite different in nature.
But according to Wittgenstein, only the last “feeling” on
this list is a sensation, or a localized, bodily feeling. Wit-
tgenstein presents this view in the following passages:
 
Is it so disagreeable, so sad, to draw down the corners of
one’s mouth, and so pleasant to pull them up? What is it
that is so frightful about fear? The trembling, the quick
breathing, the feeling in the facial muscles?—When you
say: “This fear, this uncertainty, is frightful!”—might
you go on “If only I didn’t have this feeling in my stom-
ach!” (Wittgenstein, 
 
RPP1
 
, §728)?
The expression “This anxiety is frightful!” is like a groan,
a cry. Asked “Why do you cry out?”, however—we
wouldn’t point to the stomach or the chest etc. as in the
case of pain; rather, perhaps at what gives us our fear
(
 
RPP1
 
, §729).
 
Wittgenstein recognizes with James that certain sensa-
tions such as quick breathing and feelings in one’s stom-
ach often accompany the feeling of fear. Indeed, when one
feels very afraid, one might say “I cannot bear this feeling
in my stomach.” Wittgenstein points out, however, that
when one wishes to alleviate fear, one does not have in
mind the desire to alter the feeling in one’s stomach.
Rather, one wishes to adopt a change in attitude toward
the object that arouses the fear. So, the feeling in the
stomach accompanies fear, but is not fear itself. There-
fore, the imitation of fear involving a mere playing out of
the physical manifestations of the emotion is unlikely to
generate the “warm” feeling to which James refers.
Another passage worth considering is 
 
RPP2
 
, §148, in
which Wittgenstein compares emotions and sensations:
 
Distinction from sensations: they are not localized (nor
yet diffuse!) 
Common: they have characteristic expression-behaviour.
(Facial expression.) And this itself implies characteristic
sensation too. Thus sorrow often goes with weeping, and
characteristic sensations with the latter. (The voice heavy
with tears.) But the sensations are not the emotions.
It is one thing to feel acute fear, and another to have a
‘chronic’ fear of someone. But fear is not a sensation.
‘Horrible fear’: is it the 
 
sensations
 
 that are so horrible?
 
The distinction between acute fear and chronic fear
holds the answer to Wittgenstein’s question about “horri-
ble fear.” I can conceive of myself feeling an acute fear of
someone—perhaps because she has jumped out at me
with a knife in hand. This instance of fear may very well
have a sensational correlate, such as a chill in my spine.
For Wittgenstein, I feel at least two distinct things here—
fear and a chill in my spine. I can also conceive of myself
having a chronic fear of someone. Perhaps she has a pen-
chant for stabbing people with the initials, “M.F.” If asked
what I feel about her, I am 
 
always
 
 telling the truth when I
say “I am afraid of her.” However, I do not 
 
always
 
 feel a
chill in my spine. In fact, I may always be afraid of her but
 
never
 
 feel a chill in my spine.
The experience of the woman jumping out at me with
a knife might stimulate an acute “horrible fear,” but the
concurrent sensation would not be 
 
horrible
 
 (perhaps, of
course, the sensations that I would feel if she were to stab
me would). Likewise, my chronic fear of the woman
might be a “horrible fear,” but any sensations that I feel
along with this emotion might perhaps be unpleasant, but
they are hardly horrible.
The example of fear appears in 
 
RPP2
 
, §161, in which
Wittgenstein furnishes yet another feature distinguishing
emotions from sensations:
 
To the utterance: ‘I can’t think of it without fear’ one
replies: ‘There’s no reason for fear, for...’ That is at any
rate one way of dismissing fear. Contrast with pain.
 
 
One need not know what words Wittgenstein has in
mind as belonging in place of the ellipses. The contrast
between fear and pain is evident as long as one recognizes
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that the dismissal of fear can be achieved by the hearing
of the uttered sentence. While this state-of-affairs is cer-
tainly imaginable, it is harder to conceive of a dismissal of
pain upon one’s hearing, “There’s no reason for pain,
for...” Perhaps hearing such an utterance puts one in a
better mood with respect to one’s pain, but the pain per-
sists nonetheless. One can conclude, then, that perceived
words can alter emotions, but they are incapable of alter-
ing sensations.
Similarly, emotions (such as fear) can “color”
thoughts (such as “I am afraid”) while sensations cannot:
 
I am inclined to say: emotions can 
 
colour
 
 thoughts;
bodily pain cannot. Therefore let us speak of sad
thoughts, but not, analogously, of toothachey thoughts.
Fear or indeed hope could consist only of thoughts, but
pain could not. Above all pain has the characteristics of
sensation and fear does not. Fear hangs together with
misgivings, and misgivings are thoughts (
 
RPP2
 
, §153).
 
4
 
With each of these passages, Wittgenstein extends
further blows to the tenability of James’s theory. By iden-
tifying several features distinguishing emotions from sen-
sations, Wittgenstein undermines James’s view that the
emotions are identical with their concomitant bodily man-
ifestations. 
 
2.2
 
 
 
Onions and Actors
 
Wittgenstein’s disagreement with James finds a
slightly different articulation in the following passage:
 
Possibly one could be sad because he is crying, but of
course one is not sad 
 
that
 
 he is crying. It would after all
be possible that people made to cry by application of
onions would become sad; that they would either become
generally depressed, or would start thinking about certain
events, and then grieve over them. But then the sensa-
tions of crying would not thereby have turned into a part
of the ‘feeling’ of grief (
 
RPP2
 
, §323).
 
Here, Wittgenstein is arguing that if it is the case that
emotions 
 
are
 
 the sensations of their bodily manifesta-
tions, then one ought to be able to elicit an emotion by
bringing about its bodily sensations. For example, crying
is a typical physical manifestation of grief. It should follow
then, that when one cries, one feels grief.
One can be in the presence of onions, feel the sensa-
tions associated with the physical manifestations constitu-
tive of crying, and feel no grief at all. Still, Wittgenstein
allows that one might begin to grieve upon crying, even if
the crying is a purely physical response to something with
which one has no sentimental attachment. In the case
above, the sensations of crying precede the feeling of
grief. So, there is time in which there is sensation but
there is no emotion—and this duration defies James’s the-
ory. In addition, it would be queer to say that the sensa-
tion 
 
becomes
 
 grief (or a part of grief), but it seems that
consistent adherence to his theory forces James to adopt
this position.   
This discussion of onions comes to bear on the issue
of acting, raised at the beginning of this paper. It is part of
the job of the actor to exhibit the bodily expressions typi-
cal of certain emotions, so as to convey to the audience
what emotion his character is feeling. Though actors give
the appearance of feeling emotions, we usually do not
believe that they actually 
 
feel
 
 those emotions. In this way,
the actor who cries is much like the person who cries in
the presence of an onion. Both individuals exhibit the
bodily manifestations of sadness, but at least in most
cases, neither is sad. It seems that for James, the opposite
is true. Because he holds that the bodily manifestation of
an emotion requires the feeling of that emotion, it seems
that James must insist that every actor who plays sadness
feels sadness.
James’s reaction to this objection is that many of the
bodily manifestations of emotions are in organs over
which we have no voluntary control. Thus, James would
contend that it is simply wrong to assume that actors can
perfectly simulate the bodily manifestations of an emotion
while void of the feeling of that emotion. James writes:
 
The immense number of parts modified in each emotion
is what makes it so difficult for us to reproduce in cold
blood the total and integral expression of any one of
them. We may catch the trick with the voluntary muscles,
but fail with the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera.
Just as an artificially imitated sneeze lacks something of
the reality, so the attempt to imitate an emotion in the
absence of its normal instigating cause is apt to be rather
‘hollow’ (
 
PP
 
, p. 1066).
 
For James, the actor is not able to produce within himself
an 
 
exact
 
 version of the emotion that he feigns on stage
 
because he is not able to duplicate the bodily manifestations
of the emotion
 
. Presumably, if the actor were to achieve
this duplication, he would feel the emotion that he pre-
tends to feel, to the degree in which he pretends to feel it.
Instead, the actor is liable to feel only a “hollow” version
of the emotion, despite outer appearances indicating the
contrary. Real grief can only be perfectly mimicked by
real grief, stemming from a genuine “exciting cause.” The
actor who undertakes to exhibit grief while “in cold
blood” can bring it about that he feels that emotion, but
his grief will not be marked with the same “warmth” that
it would be if it were not pretended.
 
3. On the Reconciliation of James and 
Wittgenstein
 
In this final section, I will argue that James’s thought
 
4.
 
Wittgenstein alludes to toothaches in efforts to distinguish
between emotions and sensations in other places. At §747 of
RPP1, he states, “Thoughts can be care-laden, but not toothache-
laden.” See also 
 
RPP1
 
, §804. 
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about emotions underwent some change during the
course of the twelve years separating 1890’s 
 
Principles
 
and 1902’s
 
 Varieties
 
. I will draw from the latter text to
show that James and Wittgenstein had more in common
with regard to thought about emotions than Wittgenstein
was aware.
 
5
 
In 
 
Principles
 
, James claimed that an emotion can be
described as our sensational feeling of our bodily changes
as they occur. In 
 
Varieties
 
, however, James describes
“religious rapture, moral enthusiasm, [and] ontological
wonder” (
 
VRE
 
, p. 279) as “cosmic” emotions, and con-
tends that with each of these:
 
 The best thing is to describe the condition integrally as a
characteristic affection to which our nature is liable, a
region in which we find ourselves at home, a sea in which
we swim; but not to pretend to explain its parts by deriv-
ing them too cleverly from one another (
 
VRE
 
, p. 279).
 
James’s reference to “a sea in which we swim” sug-
gests the possibility that there is more to emotions than
merely the sensations of bodily expressions, as he holds
in 
 
Principles
 
. Bodily sensation might be an element in this
sea, but at least in the case of these religious emotions,
bodily sensations do not exhaust their descriptions.
James offers clues as to what other elements might consti-
tute this sea in the following remark:
 
Now there may be great oscillation in the emotional
interest, and the hot places may shift before one almost as
rapidly as the sparks that run through burnt-up paper.
Then we have the wavering and divided self...Or the
focus of excitement and heat, the point of view from
which the aim is taken, may come to lie permanently
within a certain system; and then, if the change be a reli-
gious one, we call it a conversion, especially if it be by
crisis, or sudden (
 
VRE
 
, p. 196).
 
James mentions here the importance of the self. This
is a salient feature of emotions that goes ignored in the
chapter on emotions in 
 
Principles
 
. It seems that any emo-
tion one has is intimately tied to the self. If one feels fear,
for instance, the self is threatened; if one feels grief, the
self is diminished. A change in one’s emotions often indi-
cates a change in one’s self, not just a change in one’s sen-
sations. Conversely, a change in one’s self often indicates
a change in one’s emotions, not just a change in one’s sen-
sations. Including the self among the contributing fea-
tures of emotional states helps James subvert criticisms of
his view that the emotions are identical to the sensations
of their bodily manifestations.
 
6
 
Though I do not suggest that James is able to eschew
all of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of his theory of emotions, I
do contend that James’s thought on emotions in 
 
Varieties
 
is marked by what Wittgenstein would consider important
maturation. Like his endorsement of James’s theory in
 
Principles
 
, Wittgenstein’s endorsement of James’s theory
in
 
 Varieties
 
 would be incomplete. James gives substantive
accounts to support his “new”
 
7
 
 views on emotions when it
comes to those of the religious type, however, it may be
alleged that he treats too small of a portion of the varieties
of emotions that humans feel. The effort to completely
reconcile the thought of James and Wittgenstein would
likely be futile, however, it is important to recognize the
differences in the conceptions of emotions had by the
thinkers and judge for oneself in what ways each is more
accurate than the other.
 
8
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5.
 
I assume that
 
 Varieties 
 
did not spark much interest for Wittgen-
stein during this time, despite his having access to it when he
was compiling 
 
Remarks
 
, thirty or more years after it was pub-
lished. Had he re-read 
 
Varieties
 
, his remarks about James’s the-
ory of emotions may not have changed at all, as Wittgenstein
may have felt it necessary to expose the flaws of 
 
Principles
 
, for it
enjoyed popularity for fitting the emerging trend of behaviorism
in psychology.
 
6.
 
The difficulty of defining “the self” is a problem. James might
have defined it in 
 
Principles
 
 as one’s set of felt sensations. It
seems that the notion he uses in 
 
Varieties
 
 is more sophisticated,
involving one’s self-perception and attitude toward the world.
 
7.
 
In her insightful commentary of this paper, Jennifer McKellar
gave a convincing case for the suggestion that the account of
emotions in
 
 Varieties
 
 is nothing new; rather, it is simply a more
detailed rendering than that furnished by James in
 
 Principles
 
.
 
8.
 
It is also important that I give thanks to Heather Gert and
Gunther Tanksley for their counsel and support; without their
contributions, this essay would not have come to fruition.
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Was James a Reductionist?
 
by Stanley Harrison
 
Introduction
 
 
William James’s views concerning the nature of mind
or, more narrowly, his writings about consciousness have
received in recent years a good deal of close, penetrating,
and sometimes conflicting analyses. The question which
originally prompted this essay was whether James was a
reductionist in the manner of a physicalist who identifies
acts or states of consciousness with brain states. This
query was prompted in part by his provocative remark at
the conclusion of “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” that the
truth about the “I think” or one’s experience of the
“stream of thinking” could be converted without loss
essentially into the “the stream of my breathing.” 
 
1
 
 But,
ultimately, James was not attracted to a physicalism in the
sense of an identity theory, any more than he was
attracted to Cartesian dualism, even though he had
adopted a methodological dualism in his 
 
The Principles of
Psychology
 
.
 
2
 
 Nor does he endorse epiphenomenalism,
since one of his pivotal beliefs is in acts of will by which
we continuously and, sometimes, dramatically set our
course of action. His target, as his thought developed,
became Cartesian dualism and any remnant thereof. But
while James’s long struggle to find a way around dualistic
thinking was not one where he embraced a reductive
materialism, it also was not one which left ‘spirit’ in any
privileged ontological place. James was convinced as he
began writing “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist”? that philo-
sophically we had reached a period where the status of
consciousness as immaterial spirit had been weakened to
the point of vanishing. Indeed James tells us in 1904 that
he had been doubting the existence of consciousness as
an ‘entity’ for twenty years, thus even in the early stages
of writing 
 
The Principles
 
. By 1904, the seemingly robust
Cartesian spiritual principle was in “a thoroughly ghostly
condition.” 
 
3
 
 
 James’s 
 
Essays in Radical Empiricism
 
 constitute a
bold effort to deconstruct immaterial consciousness, and
in particular to divest it of any honored place in epistemol-
ogy. Consciousness was, he said, nothing but “the name
of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first prin-
ciples. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere
echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing
‘soul’ upon the air of philosophy.”
 
4
 
 Yet, despite James’s
 
tour de force
 
, the question of whether he really did van-
quish altogether the ghostly spiritual principle of con-
sciousness remains. Indeed, in other writings James
seems to endorse the notion of a realm of spirit or con-
sciousness which transcends or circumscribes us all, and
with which we may have vital intimate relations. Such
texts make it more difficult to settle on James’s final posi-
tion. What sort of reality, if any, did James finally grant to
consciousness? To pursue this, I consider some important
aspects of James’s argument, looking not only at what he
said but also recalling the commentary of others, notably
Charles S. Peirce and, more recently, Owen Flanagan and
Wesley E. Cooper.
 
Consciousness as an “Entity”
 
—
 
A Dispute with Peirce
 
 James was quite aware that his denial of conscious-
ness sounded preposterous to common sense and proba-
bly to many of his contemporary philosophers. As is well-
known, he begins his essay “Does ‘Consciousness’
Exist?” with a denial that consciousness is an “entity.” Not
everyone, however, found the meaning of this denial
clear, not least his friend Charles S. Peirce. Soon after
receiving the essay, Peirce told James that he was driven
to consult nearly two dozen books, plus dictionaries, to try
to figure out what James could mean. Peirce claimed that
he had never read or heard anyone ever refer to con-
sciousness as an entity. He wrote: “But your paper floors
me at the very opening and I wish you would do me the
favor...of explaining what you mean by saying that con-
sciousness is often regarded as an ‘entity’” (8.279),
 
5
 
 a “ter-
rible word,” that only caused unnecessary confusion.
(8.293) Peirce then proceeded to explain what 
 
he
 
 meant
by consciousness, discoursing at some length on the
meaning and status of simple feelings, dyadic reactions
and “the whole world of triadic relations.” (8.280-8.285).
James expressed his own exasperation two days later
when he wrote: “I have to confess that I don’t understand
a word of your letter,” but added, “As for what entity may
mean in general I know not, except it be some impercepti-
ble kind of being. In my article it meant a constituent prin-
ciple of all experience, as contrasted with a certain
function or relation between particular parts of experi-
ence. The distinction seems to me plain enough”
(8.285n.31). 
This dispute is of some importance. Peirce was right
to press James because it is crucial to know exactly what
James is renouncing. It is one thing to deny substance
dualism and quite another to deny that human conscious-
ness exhibits any spiritual nature. For most English-
 
1.
 
William James, 
 
Essays in Radical Empiricism 
 
(Cambridge, MA:
Harvard UP, 1976), p. 19. Hereinafter referred to as 
 
ERE.
 
 James
went on to stress that “breath, which was ever the original of
‘spirit’,...is...the essence out of which philosophers have con-
structed the entity known to them as consciousness.” 
 
2.
 
William James, 
 
The Principles of Psychology
 
, 2 volumes (New
York: Dover Publications, 1950). Photo reproduction of original
Henry Holt & Co. edition, 1890. Hereinafter referred to as 
 
Princi-
ples
 
.
 
3.
 
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
 
4.
 
Ibid., p. 4.
 
5.
 
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
 
 (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard U P). Vols. 1-6 edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss
(1931-1935); Vols. 7-8 edited by Arthur W. Burks (1958). Refer-
ences will be by volume and paragraph number; thus, 8.279
refers to Volume 8, Paragraph 279.
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speakers, both then and now, “entity” likely does connote
“individual thing or substance,” be it a soul-thing or a
physical thing. But James clearly intends to deny more
than individual soul-substances. His rejection of dualism
involves an equally strenuous denial of any non-physical
or 
 
spiritual act
 
 in human thinking. James writes: “There
is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, con-
trasted with that of which material objects are made, out
of which our thoughts of them are made.”
 
6
 
 James’s cri-
tique was like that of a physicalist in that he wanted to
exorcise any significant vestige of immateriality as an
ontologically independent factor in human knowing. This
was at the core of his deconstruction of consciousness.
There is no space here to pursue Peirce’s critique.
Suffice it to say that he argued that a careful analysis not
only did not lead to a denial of consciousness but rather to
recognizing three 
 
modes
 
 of consciousness. Since all three
were, for Peirce, omnipresent, it was puzzling why James
began with a denial of consciousness as a “constituent of
all experience.”
 
7
 
 Peirce also did not like James’s use of
“pure experience:” “What you call ‘pure experience’ is not
experience at all and certainly ought to have a name.”
 
8
 
 In
a remark which likely irritated James, Peirce added: “It is
downright bad morals so to misuse words, for it prevents
philosophy from becoming a science” (8.301).
Peirce’s response helps reveal the strangeness of
denying that consciousness exists. James, as noted above,
did recognize how odd his position would sound. He also
knew that a central argument for dualism in the history of
philosophy had to do with the explanation of thinking and
human knowing, that reflection required an act radically
disparate from physical events. James’s attack on dualism
required a different view of the nature of human knowing,
the relation which in
 
 Principles
 
 he had called “the most
mysterious thing in the world.”
 
9
 
 But, by the time he fin-
ished “The Idea of Consciousness” his view has utterly
changed. There he said of knowing, “It is not at all the
transcendent mystery in which so many philosophers
have taken pleasure.”
 
10
 
 What James saw Berkeley having
done to matter, namely deconstructing its ontological sta-
tus, James aimed to do with consciousness. He was not
denying that we think, only that “thought-stuff” was so dif-
ferent from “thing stuff” that we needed a dualistic meta-
physics to mark the divide. James summarized his
solution this way: “...‘physical’ and ‘mental’ are words of
sorting, not two different kinds of intrinsic nature.” 
 
11
 
James’s Deconstruction of Consciousness
 
In “The Idea of Consciousness” we find a clear state-
ment of the view which James wants to dissolve: “I believe
that consciousness, as it is commonly understood, either
as an entity or pure activity but in any case as fluid, with-
out extension, diaphanous, empty of any content proper to
itself, in short, spiritual—this consciousness, I believe, is
a pure phantasm.”
 
12
 
 Thus, not only are spiritual sub-
stances a fiction, but human consciousness reveals no
pure spiritual activity, no “bare diaphaneity” intuitively or
immediately known whenever we are thinking.
 
13
 
 For
James, “consciousness,” including reflective awareness,
was only the name invoked for the 
 
function
 
 of something
being known, not the revelation of an ontologically unique
mode of being.
 
14
 
 If we, he said, “grasp reality naively and,
as it is given to us directly,” then the “inner duplicity”
between consciousness and content is not given as an
ontological fact. Instead, both consciousness and the
world of physical objects emerge as the result of relations
among various elements of what James came to call “pure
experiences.” No irreducible heterogeneity is given in
experience taken naively. James did not deny that there
are real differences between “inner” and “outer,” but they
are not of the sort to justify ontological dualism. The same
holds, he said, of our dreaming of a mountain: “Are not
the physical and the psychic realities identical? If I dream
of a golden mountain, it certainly does not exist outside
the dream, but within the dream it has its completely
physical nature or essence. I see it as something physi-
cal.” Physical objects and ideas, despite their obvious and
important 
 
practical
 
 differences, are not “absolutely dis-
similar in nature.”
 
15
 
 The unusual properties of thoughts
such as privacy, being owned, inwardness, et.al., which he
had stressed in
 
 Principles
 
, are not denied in his later
work, but they are not taken as marks of anything irreduc-
ibly spiritual.
 
16
 
 
 
6.
 
ERE
 
, p. 4.
 
7.
 
For example, Peirce argued that “there is a certain tinge or tone
of feeling connected with living and being awake, though we can-
not attend to it, for want of a background” (8.293). As an omni-
present factor, it would qualify as a constituent of all experience.
 
8.
 
Peirce reserved the term ‘experience’ for those beliefs about the
universe which we were gradually constrained to accept.
 
9.
 
Principles
 
, I, p. 216.
 
10.
 
ERE
 
, p. 117.
 
11.
 
Ibid., p. 76.
 
12.
 
Ibid., pp. 112-113.
 
13.
 
The issue, however, is not about “intuition.” Peirce was also in
agreement that there were no good arguments supporting the
claim to an intuitive faculty. See his well-known essay of 1867/
1868, “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For
Man” (5.213-5.263).
 
14.
 
See also “The Experience of Activity” where James responded to
an earlier criticism that in his explanation of a sense of self in
 
Principles
 
 (Vol. I, pp. 299-305) he had reduced spiritual activity to
the experience of certain muscular feelings of intracephalic
movements, by saying: “I sought to show that there is no direct
evidence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual agent as
such. (I should now say the activity of ‘consciousness’ as such)”
 
ERE
 
, pp. 85-86, n. 8.
 
15.
 
Ibid., p. 108; James’s discussion of affectional facts is meant to
bring out the same kind of ambiguity between the ‘subjective’
and the ‘objective’. For example, we do not know whether we
should say that objects are vile or that we have a vile feeling.
Which placement we make is a matter of context.
 
16.
 
See 
 
Principles
 
, Vol. 1, “The Stream of Thought,” pp. 225-226 and
his discussion of “the Spiritual Self,” pp. 296ff.
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The Metaphysics of Pure Experience and the 
Philosophy of Mind
 
To fully appreciate how James understood “mind”
and consciousness, one must consider further what he
meant by pure experience and the relation it bears to
human subjectivity or consciousness. This is more diffi-
cult than it might seem because there does not appear to
be clear agreement on how to interpret the notion of pure
experience. We begin with a passage from James in which
indicated its importance: “The instant field of the present
is at all times what I call the ‘pure’ experience. It is only
virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For
the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or exist-
ence, a simple 
 
that
 
.”
 
17
 
 And later, he adds: “...there is no
general stuff of which experience at large is made. There
are as many stuffs as there are ‘natures’ in the things
experienced. If you ask what any one bit of pure experi-
ence is made of, the answer is always the same. ‘It is made
of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flat-
ness, brownness, heaviness, or what not.’...Experience is
only a collective name for all these sensible natures; save
for time and space (and if you like, for ‘being’)...there
appears no universal element of which all things are
made.” 
 
18
 
 
Such passages display the unusual character of pure
experience. James’s denial of any general stuff, for exam-
ple, would seem to mitigate against a monistic interpreta-
tion. Here he restricted himself to a description of what is
given in the immediacy of consciousness, “of just what
appears.” If one stays strictly with the immediate then, all
we have are the qualia (the “brownness, heaviness, or
what not”), examples of what Peirce called the firstness of
consciousness, the felt immediacy of whatever was
present considered out of all relation to anything else, and
thus, as Peirce argued, is devoid of cognition. Modes of
connectedness constitute those relations which form the
basis for cognition. James agreed that what we call some-
thing is a matter of what relations are involved. One of his
best examples of this occurs near the end of “The Idea of
Consciousness” where he wants to give an account of
knowing without invoking consciousness as “an ontologi-
cal fact.” To do this he appeals to pure experience as a
form of neutral monism. He writes: “Let us imagine, then,
that the primary reality is of a neutral nature, and let us
call it by some still ambiguous name like phenomenon,
datum, Vorfindung. I myself like to speak of it in the plural
and call it 
 
pure experiences
 
.”
 
19
 
 Then, to explain how the all-
important distinction between knower and known, experi-
encing subject and content known, grows up inside expe-
rience, James hypothesized further: “These pure
experiences exist and succeed one another, enter into infi-
nitely varied relations with one another, relations that are
themselves essential parts of the fabric of experience.”
 
20
 
His point is that groups or sets of relations form and that
because of the fecundity of these combinations of pure
experiences, that “one and the same experience...can play
a role in several fields at the same time.”
 
21
 
 Like the drop
of ink which can be at the intersection of two lines, James
argued that the same experience can be in two fields of
associations simultaneously. The example he used was
the ordinary experience of perceiving the room as 
 
physi-
cal
 
 with its various parts (walls, table, chairs, other rooms,
etc.) and of that same experience taken as a 
 
thought
 
within one’s mind. He continued: “In this complete, con-
crete, and undivided experience, just as it is there given,
the objective physical world and the inner and personal
world of each of us meet and fuse as lines fuse at their
intersection. This sensible reality...and the sensation it
produces in us are, at the moment the sensation occurs,
absolutely identical. Reality and apperception are one.”
 
22
 
In this James explicitly agreed with Berkeley, that 
 
esse est
percipi,
 
 meaning that “our sensations are not little inner
copies of things, they are the things themselves insofar as
those things are present to us.”
 
23
 
 
 Thus, we have two worlds present simultaneously,
the physical world of the room with its distinctive rela-
tions to other physical things, and the context of personal
experience with these same contents “as something
‘reported,’ known, conscious....” James acknowledged
that in this latter context, “this room is linked with things
of a radically different nature,” namely, with other
thoughts, perhaps only a fleeting item in one’s biography,
as a psychic fact with very different properties (e.g., with-
out weight, incombustible, etc.), “and yet it is exactly the
same room we are dealing with in both instances.”
 
24
 
 This
led James to ask: “What are we speaking of then, if not of
 
that, 
 
of the same part of material nature that our minds at
this very moment embrace, which takes its place, exactly
as it is, in the private experience of this moment for each
of us, and which our memory will preserve as an integral
part of our history? It is absolutely one and the same stuff
that appears simultaneously, according to its context, as
something material and physical, or as an element in our
inner consciousness. I believe, therefore, that we cannot
treat consciousness and matter as if they were different in
essence.”
 
25
 
 Considering this room as something fleeting,
physically inert, linked to emotional interests, etc., such
traits are what James means by the grouping of experi-
ences. Then he added: “It is by entering at this moment
into a great number of these psychic groups that this
room now becomes something conscious, something
related, something known.”
 
26
 
 James maintained that
“experiences....
 
become
 
 conscious in their entirety, they
 
17.
 
ERE
 
, p. 13.
 
18.
 
ERE
 
, pp. 14-15.
 
19.
 
ERE
 
, p. 114. James calls it an “an altogether rudimentary
monism.” 
 
20.
 
Ibid. 
 
21.
 
ERE
 
, p. 115.
 
22.
 
Ibid. 
 
23.
 
ERE
 
, p. 108.
 
24.
 
ERE
 
, p. 115.
 
25.
 
ERE
 
, p. 116.
 
26.
 
Ibid.
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become
 
 physical in their entirety; and it is,” he continued,
“by means of addition that this effect is achieved.”
 
27
 
 The
addition of which he speaks is the process whereby a
physical thing (a desk) gets connected with its typical
associates and the process whereby we experience that
same thing getting connected with other very different
associates, namely, those we locate in a mental world.
Understanding this conclusion is not easy, and James
knew this. Part of the difficulty is due to an equivocation
in the use of the term “experience.” As I understand
James, the pure experiences of which he spoke are
“events” which, taken in their purity, are not to be thought
of as conscious states or as physical. This is so because
for James consciousness or awareness is something
which 
 
happens to us
 
 (and continues to happen) as a result
of something more basic going on, namely, the growing
together of non-conscious events (the pure experiences),
processes of an all-at-onceness which are out of sight of
any of us. This is why he said that “the knowledge of
things 
 
happens
 
 to them” and is not due to “a transcenden-
tal ego, or a Bewusstheit, or an act of consciousness...”
 
28
 
But is there not a serious ambiguity here? The claim
that we achieve insights is not, according to James, the
consequence of any immaterial act of consciousness.
While it is true that we speak of insights coming to us or
happening to us, our gaining, for example, the new insight
which James seeks to convey, it also seems impossible to
explain except as an achievement requiring a radically
interior act, a type of act which also makes it possible for
us to name what we have achieved. No one need deny
that there are two different contexts involved. The issue
remains: do human insight, understanding, naming and
judging involve irreducible immaterial processes? What
James seems to have done with his description of cogni-
tion is to freeze the process at the phase of immediacy,
where indeed there is no cognition (as Peirce had
stressed) and then simply declare that no immaterial act
is necessary. It seems that James has eliminated the “spir-
itual” or non-physical activity from human cognition by
fiat. 
 
“Pure Experience”—A New Metaphysics 
or Metaphysical Agnosticism?
 
Understanding the relation between pure experience
and consciousness has been integral to some recent
attempts to come to grips with James’s philosophy of
mind. When James wrote
 
 Principles
 
 he was strongly inter-
ested in the correlation between brain events and states of
consciousness. He did not argue for their identity. Owen
Flanagan recently has discussed how James considered
and rejected epiphenomenalism, parallelism, and the idea
of consciousness as some kind of Chief Executive Officer,
materialist or spiritualist, as viable explanations of the
undeniable interaction between mind/consciousness and
brain. Flanagan’s essay is particularly noteworthy
because it is prompted in large part by his own shift from
previously interpreting James as a naturalist to defending
him as a non-naturalist, thus as some kind of dualist,
because he came to see that “there are parts of James’s
overall philosophy that require him to resist natural-
ism.”
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 Some aspects of Flanagan’s discussion merit spe-
cial attention here.
Flanagan acknowledges that one of the potentially
most serious inconsistencies is James’s lecture on
“Human Immortality.” In that talk James argued that
despite accepting as a postulate that “thought is a function
of the brain” one could still coherently conceive of human
consciousness as being metaphysically capable of exist-
ing apart from the brain, if it were the case that the brain
was more like a conduit for thought than the actual pro-
ducer of thought. By distinguishing three different kinds
of functions,
 
30
 
 James argued for the possibility of human
consciousness having its metaphysical basis in, and being
continuous with, some larger form of consciousness. 
 
31
 
Flanagan does not endorse this view, but only says that
James was right in claiming that it is 
 
logically
 
 possible, not
that it is probable, let alone true. In other words, admit-
ting thought as a function of the brain does not settle the
issue as to the exact nature of this relation since there
may be a ‘function’ which escapes the assumptions of the
physicalist. One cannot conclude, therefore, that James
had endorsed a physicalism or any other view which
would make consciousness radically dependent on the
brain. 
But Flanagan also acknowledges that the potentially
more serious charge to his own thesis concerns the posi-
tion James presents in 
 
ERE
 
. These seem to show that
James gave up the postulated dualism of
 
 Principles
 
 and
strove for an original metaphysical position which offered
a new non-dualist view of knowing. To save James from
the charge of inconsistency, Flanagan argues that James’s
embrace of pure experience does not justify a metaphysi-
cal shift, notably to the neutral monism endorsed by some
interpreters. When James writes that “‘Pure experience’ is
the name (for)...the immediate flux of life which furnishes
the material to our later reflection with its conceptual cate-
gories...an experience pure in the literal sense of a that
which is not yet a definitive what,”
 
32
 
 he need not be com-
mitted to a neutral monism, despite what James himself
said. To declare for neutral monism is to convert illicitly a
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phenomenological description into a metaphysical view.
Flanagan thinks that James’s descriptions of primordial
experience as prior to the subjective-objective distinction
we eventually invoke should just be taken 
 
epistemologi-
call
 
y. And if James or anyone else goes beyond this, then
each errs by assuming that “
 
ontology recapitulates ontog-
eny
 
.”
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 In other words, it can be true that the immediate
flux of life is always already prior to our conceptualiza-
tions and categories, that human consciousness arises for
each of us out of something beyond the reach of our
insight, etc., and yet we are not justified in making 
 
meta-
physical
 
 claims about these foundational conditions or
events. Thus, Flanagan does not endorse the move to a
neutral monism. He opts for a metaphysical agnosticism.
Flanagan thinks that James should stick with a Humean
skepticism and say, “We just don’t know” what is meta-
physically basic. 
Flanagan does like James’s rejection of conscious-
ness as a thing, substance or entity, “either as immaterial
substance or as a 
 
faculty
 
 of the brain.”
 
34
 
 But then it seems
that Flanagan makes the same error that Peirce attributed
to James. Like James, Flanagan also apparently thinks
that there are people who consider consciousness an
“entity.” But I think Peirce was right in objecting to this as
an accepted usage, and so to applaud James is to applaud
a mistake. Flanagan goes on to agree also that “James’s
belief that things get reported and are known does not
require positing a faculty of consciousness, immaterial or
material. Experiences will do.”
 
35
 
 These remarks are less
than clear. But James was not trying to eliminate con-
sciousness altogether from epistemology but only wanting
to avoid any appeal to a faculty. What remains unsettled
and unacceptably vague, however, is whether James’s
functional distinction between “mind” and “matter” is, as
Flanagan claims, “like the distinction between up and
down, in and out, and the like.”36 Presumably, he means
that he endorses James’s talk about mind and matter is
only a question of changing “contexts.” But the question
begging which goes on here has been noted above. The
issue is not whether there are two contexts, but whether
the context of mind involves irreducible immateriality.
From Metaphysical Agnosticism to 
Protomentality
 The ultimate status of mind or the mental in James’s
metaphysics is actually pursued more effectively, I think,
in an article by W. E. Cooper37 which in fact induced
Flanagan to change his mind about James. Unlike Flana-
gan’s adoption of metaphysical agnosticism concerning
the basis for human subjectivity, Cooper argues that the
most viable position points to a view of pure experience
which he calls “protomental.” Recognizing the conflicts
among interpreters of James, Cooper aims to reconcile
aspects of James’s neutral monism and his panpsychism
by taking seriously “James’s distinction between scientific
and metaphysical levels of inquiry.”38 The result, he says,
is a Jamesian metaphysics which is “very different from
the physicalist and dualist accounts which dominate dis-
cussion of the mind-body problem.” 39 At the risk of over-
simplifying the discussion, the central issue has to do,
paradoxically, with the “nature” of pure experience.40
Unlike Flanagan, Cooper argues that “the Neutral Monist
reading is fundamentally correct at the metaphysical
level...but it must concede to the panpsychist account that
pure experience is protomental.” 41 Cooper seeks a “mid-
dle way” between neutral monism and panpsychism. But
this, he says, requires that we distinguish between “the
protomental and the essentially mental.”42 What Cooper
means by the essentially mental is experience character-
ized “as necessarily private, inner, and subjective.” 43 But
experiences with these traits, which are central to self-
awareness, are not primordial because mind as self-aware
is an achievement, a result of experiences gradually
becoming known in a special way.44 Cooper sees other
traits as more basic in James’s original description of the
stream of consciousness in The Principles. These are flux
or changingness, continuity and, most importantly, pur-
pose. Cooper treats these traits as ‘protomental’, and,
therefore, as prior to mind taken in the narrower sense of
human subjectivity with its privacy and inwardness.
According to Cooper, James failed to distinguish these
two levels of mentality.
By trimming a robust panpsychism one gets, he says,
an attenuated form of it, namely, the protomentality of
pure experience, and this explains why James denied that
the mental was metaphysically ultimate. What he didn’t
deny and, claims Cooper, should have affirmed, is that
pure experience is protomental. The key points of Coo-
per’s argument have to do with how James defends the
claim that pure experience, while not yet truly subjective
or inward, is already purposive and owned, that is, has the
trait of “my-ness” (Cooper’s term). He writes: “There is no
purposive agent that unifies and directs pure experience,
according to James’s radical empiricism; rather, pure
33. Quoted by Flanagan on p. 43. 
34. Ibid., p. 44-45.
35. Ibid., p. 45.
36. Ibid., p. 46.
37.  Wesley E. Cooper, “William James’s Theory of Mind,” Journal of
the History of Philosophy, 28.4 (October): pp. 571-593.
38. Ibid., p. 571.
39. Ibid., p. 593.
40. I say “paradoxically” because one of James’s fundamental claims
is that our talk of the natures of things is itself already the result
of “taking” pure experiences in certain ways; in other words, it is
an added element. But one can hardly avoid asking about the
“nature” of pure experiences.
41. Cooper, p. 572.
42. Ibid., p. 574.
43. Ibid., p. 575.
44. Indeed, self-awareness is subsequent to and, in life as we know it,
dependent on the outer world of physical events, objects, and
especially other persons. James stressed this, for example, when
he described the development of infant awareness.
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experience natively contains the sense of being personally
owned and purposefully directed by such an agent.”45
Traits which James had ascribed to personal conscious-
ness in The Principles, namely, its native selectivity, inten-
tionality, and being owned by someone, Cooper locates in
the more primordial pure experiences. By doing so, he
can claim that “James’s universe was ultimately teleologi-
cal, but it was not ultimately private, subjective, and inner,
just as it was not ultimately physical, intersubjective, and
outer.”46 What is striking about this is the attribution of
purpose or telos as a metaphysically ultimate feature out
of all relation to an agent. It is not apparent that such a
claim is coherent. Purposiveness has been separated from
the one context, namely personal agency, which renders
it fully intelligible. Now it is alleged, by Cooper, as a brute
fact characterizing the protomental. 
Of equal interest is Cooper’s defense of James’s view
of consciousness in The Principles as a non-physical
causal force. He argues that for James “Consciousness is
not an irruption into the physical universe of a new nature,
because both consciousness and the physical universe
are different arrangements of the same nature, namely,
pure experience.” 47 But on this view, it seems that nothing
at all counts, or could count, as a new nature, particularly
since James has said that there isn’t any general stuff con-
stituting pure experiences. There is an unlimited plurality
of stuffs, namely, all those natures which just do make
their appearance. The emergence of self-consciousness
and our radical capacity to name and to know would only
be serendipitous outcomes, abetted in some mysterious
way by a deep telic process working on (according to Coo-
per) protomental experience. Surprisingly, Flanagan had
argued that even the emergence of immaterial mind from
the realm of pure experiences, mediated by evolutionary
processes, would not count as metaphysically trouble-
some or inconsistent for James with his Darwinian com-
mitments. 48 Does it not seem inconsistent to accept the
possibility of immaterial mind and yet deny this as meta-
physically novel?
Cooper requires that pure experience “has some fea-
tures which are characteristic of the mental....
(Indeed)...these protomental features may be understood
as characterizing the physical world as well as the essen-
tially mental, since both are constructed out the purposive
material of pure experience.”49 But while one might agree
that to say the universe is purposive is not to say that it is
populated by egos, souls, or substantial minds, still it is to
commit oneself to a metaphysics in which Mind is pri-
mary. In addition, Cooper’s use of ‘purposiveness’ is so
extensive, that it accounts for the objectivity of the physi-
cal world of objects. Thus, he ends up claiming that “as
well as being protomental,...original experience is proto-
physical.”50 At this point, it becomes difficult to see why
he had been arguing for the primacy of the protomental. 
Conclusions
It is noteworthy that both Cooper and Flanagan allow
for the immateriality of consciousness, even going so far
as to argue (Flanagan) that evolution could generate
immaterial mind. This admission certainly seems to count
in favor of some form of panpsychism, as well as admit
that immateriality which James set out to deny in his
Essays. The interpretation of protomentality offered by
Cooper is strained to the breaking point, particularly in
his puzzling assignment of the trait of “ownership” to pure
experience. Minimally, both Flanagan and Cooper agree
that James was not a reductionist in the sense of convert-
ing mind into matter. The reduction is to something more
basic, namely, to pure experience which in the hands of
Cooper becomes protomental, but for Flanagan meta-
physically unknowable. Cooper recognizes that mentality
in the strong sense requires an adequate metaphysical
basis. With him we return, then, to the primacy of mind
and are led toward the issue of theism and the conscious-
ness of God which we know James defended. His reduc-
tion to pure experience opens out into the mystery of the
divine. 
— Stanley Harrison is an associate professor of philoso-
phy at Marquette University. He specializes in pragmatism,
particularly the thought of Charles Peirce.
E-mail = stanley.harrison@marquette.edu
 
 
 
45. Cooper, p. 576. It is also worth noting that, on this view, James’s
theism is affected. Pure experience with its purposive character
as simply given would be primordial for the gods as well. Thus,
purposiveness, a defining trait of persons, including personal
gods, threatens to become a metaphysical surd, a brute fact with-
out explanation. 
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 581.
48. Flanagan, pp. 36-37.
49. Cooper, p. 589. 50. Ibid., p. 590.
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On Habit and Consciousness: 
A Peircean Critique of William 
James’s Conception of Habit
 
by Tamba Nlandu
 
1. Introduction
 
This paper aims at discussing some insights and
oversights of William James’s conception of habit as well
as some implications of such a conception in his view of
human consciousness. It aims at showing that to conceive
of habit as a physical fact may not only lead to the same
type of mind-body dualism that James hopes to refute but
also turn habit into a conservative, not dynamic, agent of
society, in which case the concept of habit seems to be
exclusively associated with sheer regularity. Such an
account of mind would, indeed, entail that the relationship
between mind and body is one of interaction, not transac-
tion, as most of the so-called classical American pragma-
tists would want to claim. While this conception of habit
may help explain the distinction James makes between
the conscious and the unconscious, it does at the same
time obscure his ability to provide a sound explanation for
the basis of human moral conduct. 
Provided these difficulties, which appear to be inher-
ent in James’s view, we shall argue, in the light of Charles
S. Peirce, that to conceive of habit as a general, that is, a
“tendency toward generalization,” to use Peirce’s own
terms, is to construe it to be the dynamic, not conserva-
tive, agent of society. Such an account of habit carries
more explanatory power for elucidating the relationship
between human reason, consciousness, and self-control,
thus providing a more reasonable explanation for the
basis of human moral conduct.
 
 
 
According to Peirce, the concept of habit presents
itself here as the bridge between compulsive experience
and acquisition of information, between behavior and
meaning. As such habit is essentially a medium of repre-
sentation. It is the instance, within the process of cogni-
tion, whereby meaning attains the degree of generality
necessary for meaningful communication. Since percep-
tion is a process of information acquisition through the
mediation of some representations, it appears necessary
at this point to assume the existence of a mechanism of
translation of empirical data into a symbolic code under-
standable by the mind. In order for our assumption to
make sense, it appears that we have to suggest that if
such a mechanism exists, it has to reside in both the per-
ceiving mind and the things perceived. Peirce finds such a
mechanism in the concept of habit. Accordingly, the con-
cept of habit presents itself as the medium that “bridge[s]
the gap between the inner world of mental signs which in
themselves offer no criterion for meaning and the outer
world where the meaning of a sign or a complex sign can
be established through the criterion of the behavior
which follows upon the use of the sign in question.”
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Habit, we shall see, is the instance of mental repre-
sentation whereby the interpretant of a sign becomes a
general
 
2
 
 (2.315). It is only at this point that thought
becomes generative, inferential, and expectative. For, as
Peirce notes, “thought must live and grow in incessant
new and higher translations, or it proves itself not to be
genuine thought” (5.594). The function of habit is, thus, to
supply the mind with these translations. Such a view sup-
poses a conception of human nature, which defies tradi-
tional characterizations. Here, the concept of habit is no
longer just another unit of behavior. It is rather a process
of assigning meaning to empirical data. Before examining
Peirce’s view, let us succinctly introduce James’s concep-
tion and discuss some implications of a view construing
habit to be just another unit of behavior.
 
2. Habit Is a Physical Fact
 
According to William James, a habit is to be
regarded, first of all, as a “physical fact,” that is, as an
overt and observable fact.   It is a disposition of man’s cen-
tral nervous system that provides a basis for the develop-
ment of his mental life. Hence, James believes that it
would be absurd to talk of habit if it were not something
founded in “the fundamental properties of matter.”
Among those properties is the plasticity that allows it to
change and at the same time conserve some of its basic
elements. This means, although he accounts for a world
of evolution, James believes that at first the laws of nature
are mere “immutable habits” of matter.
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   But he soon
realizes the complexity of such an idea.   Because while
some elements and structures of matter are endowed with
extreme resistance to change, the world is also equipped
with elements endowed with sufficient plasticity that
enables men and all the other living beings to survive the
multiple changing conditions of their environment.
Man as a product of evolution is equipped from birth
with organs that possess potential instinctive patterns of
action, which quickly become part of the evolutionary pro-
cess. Because of the plasticity of his central nervous sys-
tem, and because of his actions and reactions on the
environment, new habits tend to be formed. As one would
suspect, here James tries to reject the traditional mind-
body dualism which, by holding that the body is, so to
say, dead matter without the mind, seems to claim that
the body is not as essential as the mind in man’s life. For
experience teaches us that the fixation of new regular
pathways through the central nervous system has many
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implications on man’s daily activities.   First, it “simplifies
our movements, makes them accurate, and diminishes
fatigue.”
 
4
 
   Second, it reduces the conscious attention in
the accomplishment or execution of our acts.   In fact the
process of acquisition of habits shows that the body is as
involved as is the mind.   Thus, for James, both the body
and the mind are essential to man. This type of epito-
mized form of the mind-body interaction appears to be
characteristic of American pragmatists. For mind is said
to emerge from bodily activity, so “interaction” is a poor
word reminiscent of Descartes insofar as to claim that
organisms interact with their environment would entail, in
the spirit of radical empiricism, some type of transaction
between the mind and its object.
Another very important point that is worthy of notice
in James is that habit is present in every single act of
man’s life. The fact that it diminishes consciousness does
not mean that man becomes an automaton. It is true, he
maintains, that habit is “the enormous fly-wheel of soci-
ety, [thus] its most precious conservative agent.”
 
5
 
 But it is
also true that it is because of it that man is able to notice
and control any changes, which occur in his actions. Take
the case of a typist. When he begins his training, every
single key requires full attention. As the training goes on,
most of his actions become automatic.   He can even get
involved in a conversation while typing correctly. In addi-
tion, he is still capable of detecting an error as soon as he
touches the wrong key. As a result, this we know from
experience, the typist’s immediate reaction is a quick
check of what he has just typed. In fact consciousness is
latent in every habitual act. It emerges as soon as it is
called upon for help. 
James’s treatment of habit provides some fundamen-
tal hints for understanding two major concerns of his
thought, namely, (1) the distinction between the con-
scious and the unconscious, and (2) the basis for moral
conduct. As has been pointed out above, James’s rejection
of the traditional mind-body dichotomy results in a new
conception of experience and a new perspective of the
knowing process. He no longer accepts the view that the
only way we can know our mental states is by introspec-
tion, that is, through observation of our own internal
states. In other words, he rejects the traditional claim that
meaning is a product of our conceptualization of the world
rather than a result of our being first of all a concrete part
of it. Hence, as Wild is right to point out, James’s reply to
the traditional view consists in saying that “men first
become acquainted with this world not by conceptualizing
it but by actively living in it”, because “there is a logic of
life quite distinct from that of conceptual understanding.”
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Provided this new conception of experience and of the
knowing process, a new conception of the distinction
between the conscious and the unconscious is thus
needed. James believes that such a conception essentially
relies on the law of habit. Because, he argues, if it is rea-
sonable to say that any increase in degree of habit causes
a decrease in consciousness, then it is right to assume
that habit and consciousness are opposite forces. This
opposition can be understood in terms of their inverse
variability since “where habit is fixed and firm, conscious-
ness is at low ebb, where intense, habit is unstable.”
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 All
these processes of variation occur as the result of the
activity of our central nervous system. James’s account of
consciousness has several complexities and difficulties of
its own. But it is worth noting that, for James, the greater
the complexity of the nervous system the lesser living
creatures are capable of reacting “with firmness and cer-
tainty” in various circumstances. This is particularly true
of the so-called lower animals whose nervous system,
because of the regularity and “predictability” of its pat-
terns of action, allows them to react unconsciously but,
say, with assurance and firmness where human beings
cannot. 
Men and the higher animals are, however, capable of
something the lower animals cannot accomplish, namely,
of choosing a specific thing among multiple alternatives.
But it is only in man that consciousness plays its full role
of stabilizing patterns of actions and reinforcing the for-
mation of new habits while it allows him at the same time
to invent new patterns of meaning.   In fact, for James,
“consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting
agency,”
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 which, in the case of man, involves reflection,
hesitation, deliberation, and a choice that ought to be
meaningful. For, he goes on to claim, “where indecision is
great, consciousness is agonizingly intense.”
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What are the practical effects of the law of habit on
man’s moral conduct? As a conservative agent of society,
habit serves as the vehicle by means of which bad as well
as good moral patterns of action are passed from genera-
tion to generation. Hence, every society must provide its
members the appropriate education or training for the for-
mation of good habits, that is, habits, which will allow
them to make meaningful and useful choices. Indeed, as
James notes in his 
 
Talks to Teachers of Psychology
 
, “All our
life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits—
practical, emotional, and intellectual—systematically
organized for our weal or woe, and bearing us irresistibly
towards our destiny, whatever the latter may be.”
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 How-
ever, one wonders about the logical consistency of such a
position insofar as there appears to be no attempt at some
sort of “thirdness” which would provide the basis for con-
struing habit as a rule of action. This said, let us now turn 
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our attention to Peirce’s attempt at a solution to this prob-
lem. 
 
3. Habit Is Always a General
 
 
Contrary to James who deals with the concept of
habit in terms of subjective or individual reaction, Peirce
stresses the fact that every act man accomplishes must be
defined in terms of its communicability. For, man being at
bottom social, each of his acts is a habit of action that is
public and general, that is, cannot be thought of without
the mediation of signs. Although both James and Peirce
regard thought as essentially inferential, predictive, and
expectative, it is worth noting that James reasons from
the individual, that is, from the particular, and Peirce from
the general. Peirce maintains that thought is always sym-
bolic, that is, general insofar as it is always communica-
ble. 
 Habit, for Peirce, is a “tendency toward generaliza-
tion”, a tendency that, so to say, resides in everything that
is endowed with plasticity and capacity of evolution.
Although it may be found in the organic world, habit is
essentially an element of the human mind. For, he claims,
the mind is “the most plastic of all things” (7.515). How-
ever, it is not clear whether Peirce considers a habit as a
natural disposition or something that is acquired only
through experience, that is, by means of signs and sym-
bols. In most cases, he recognizes the existence of innate
potentialities that have to be informed and developed by
the acquisition of habits through experience. This means
that man has a natural, innate disposition to take habits
and to exercise a certain control over them. For a habit is
at bottom a disposition of the mind. However, Peirce may
still be regarded as a behaviorist of some sort. In fact he
maintains that thought fundamentally involves the gen-
eral laws of nervous action. In other words, he believes
that a habit arises through its reactions to various stimuli
of the natural and social world as soon as the nervous sys-
tem forms patterns of reactions that tend to become eas-
ier on repetition, and opens the possibility for new
reactions to take place. Therefore, habit is “the leading
principle” of all human action. 
Hence a habit is to be regarded not as an action, but
rather as the guide of thought. According to Peirce,
thought grows through three essential processes,
namely, (1) the formation of habits, (2) the breaking up of
some of the old habits, and (3) the replacement of old bro-
ken habits by new ones which, by the way, get reinforced
in accordance with the laws of evolution (7.268, 7.270).
Since the purpose of thought is the settlement of “a belief,
a rule of action, a habit of thought”, a habit can be distin-
guished from action by the fact that it involves generality,
whereas an action involves singularity. An action is simply
an instance of a habit. Thus, insofar as Peirce considers a
habit as a general principle, and because generality, by
being of the essence of mind, is not something reducible
to mere physical regularity, a habit must be regarded as
“a disposition or readiness to act which will, or would, be
carried out if the proper conditions are, or were to be real-
ized.”
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 In other words, because the principle of chance is
really operative in nature beside that of mechanical regu-
larity we experience, a habit may be either a “will-be” or a
“would-be”. It involves, Peirce maintains, a real continuity
because it regulates both actual and existent happenings
that occur according to it.
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 Therefore, a habit is a real
general law that is active in nature, and that is derived
from experience. The law of habit, for Peirce, governs not
only all physical but also psychical action. Thus the ques-
tion: what are its practical effects on man’s conduct?
To answer this question, it seems necessary to begin
with a short account of the nature of man. Man, Peirce
claims, lives in two worlds, an “inner” and an “outer” ones.
The interaction between the two worlds is achieved by his
acquired habits and his natural dispositions (5.487). Man
is part of a natural world in which he finds himself as
endowed with the power of reason. Reason, according to
him, is the capacity for critical review and control of
actions and habits of action. In other words, it is the
source of man’s power of self-control.   It is because man
is a rational animal that he can be regarded as different
from the other animals. For reason essentially involves
the freedom to choose among various alternatives of his
actions, though there is no doubt that that freedom does
not allow him to choose his own nature or even his own
freedom. It also allows for symbolizing those alternatives
in the present. 
Along with his reason, man has another distinctive
power: consciousness. Although consciousness does not
always imply the capacity of self-control, Peirce maintains
that every being that possesses the power of self-control
is necessarily endowed with consciousness. Hence, con-
sciousness is a criterion of man, but it is not a sufficient
one. It requires reason if man is to be regarded as a being
that fundamentally differs from others because of his
capacity of control and self-control. Thus, consciousness
is, so to say, mere spontaneity that needs to be supple-
mented by reasoning and habits. However, it is worth not-
ing that in most of its degrees, consciousness is
something man has no control over, except in the case of
reflexive consciousness. 
Man is, therefore, a being of actions and ideals. His
conduct is shaped according to the rules provided, on the
one hand, by his natural environment, and, on the other
hand, by his consciousness and reason. Each of his ideals
becomes an ideal of conduct, which turns to be a real
potentiality for future action. Then under the law of evolu-
tion (regularity and chance), it becomes a habit, that is, a
law of conduct. Now since man is endowed with the
power to review, criticize, and control his ideals, he
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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1961), p. 162.
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becomes in the long run capable of reviewing, criticizing,
and controlling his own review, criticism, and control.
Thus, from his habits emerges self-control.
According to Peirce, through the process of habit-tak-
ing, every individual ideal tends to become an ultimate
end applicable to every rational being. First of all, for
Peirce, human behavior is explicable and understandable
in terms of the categories of thought, because “all there
is, is, First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; Third, Habits”
(6.201). Firstness is the category of sheer possibility, Sec-
ondness, of actuality, and Thirdness, of the necessary in
the sense of a “would-be.” These three categories are
really distinct and irreducible, but they cannot be sepa-
rated in experience. Thirdness is the category of thought,
law, and regularity. Now, since an action is particular and
existent, it is a second. But as soon as it becomes an
instance of a habit, in which case it establishes itself as a
general, it becomes a third. However, a habit can never
become absolutely necessary without becoming “wooden
and ineradicable” (6.148), in which case it would no
longer be a habit. 
Reason, we have seen, is the locus of man’s power of
self-control. With the addition of his power of deliberation,
man becomes a being of habits, that is, of “rules, norms or
general patterns,” that are nothing but “acquired disposi-
tions to act in a certain way rather than in another.”
 
13
 
Thus, habits are the foundation of man’s power to control
his action, and even to control his own control. Notice
that, for Peirce, there are three degrees of consciousness:
first, consciousness of feeling, passive consciousness of
quality; second, consciousness of an interruption of con-
sciousness; third, consciousness of learning, thought
(1.377-382). But it is important to note that consciousness,
in all its degrees and in relation to habit, is Firstness,
whereas habit is always Thirdness. On the other hand,
one must distinguish among the various types of self-con-
trol those “inhibitions and coordinations,” which entirely
escape consciousness from the instinctive modes of self-
control, which, in turn, must be distinguished from the
type of self-control that results from training as well as the
capacity to control one’s own self-control in virtue of some
moral rule and the power to control one’s control of con-
trol, that is, when one undertakes to improve his rule in
virtue of an esthetic ideal (5.533). Thus, since a human
being is rational, he has a purpose, which has to be
achieved according to the general laws of nature. He has
the power to consciously take habits through reflection.
This general tendency to take habits is itself a habit. Pro-
vided their natural dispositions and the laws of nature,
human beings acquire the power to control and criticize
their habits, and then develop, modify, and correct their
old patterns of action so that habits can never become
totally and ineradicably fixed. 
 
4. Conclusion: Habit, Communication, 
and Consciousness
 
We have argued in the present paper that for James
habit seems to be exclusively associated with sheer regu-
larity, in which case it would essentially be a physical
(neurological) fact, something Peirce would regard as the
quality of feeling. As a result James tends to construe
habit to be the conservative rather than the dynamic
agent of society. Moreover, James’s psychological expla-
nation of human conduct appears to lead him to regard
the individual as the basis for ethical laws. By stressing
individual actual consequences, he leaves out generality
and possibility for general objective conduct. 
Peirce, on the other hand, constructs his theory upon
the idea that habit is essentially an element of the human
mind, and as such it is a disposition of the mind. For
human beings have innate potentialities that are informed
and developed by the acquisition of habits through experi-
ence. When a habit has become a rule of action, it
becomes a biological incarnation that can be transmitted
from generation to generation. Habit is, thus, always gen-
eral and dynamic. Under the laws of nature, regularity and
chance, certain old habits are broken and new habits
formed. In the long run, habit then establishes itself as a
real general law governing both physical and psychical
actions. 
Elaborated from a logical standpoint, Peirce’s
account of habit elucidates the nature of man’s power of
self-control by clarifying the relation between (1) reason
and consciousness, (2) physical and psychical action, and
(3) singularity and generality. Although several points
remain puzzling, such as the genuine applicability of the
law of chance, Peirce’s treatment of habit lays the ground-
work for a theory of mind that would construe experience
as primarily our conscious encounter with some reality
out there.   Here Peirce’s theory of habit has much in
common with that of John Dewey. 
In fact, as Dewey would agree with Peirce, “without
habit there is only irritation and confused hesitation. With
habit alone there is a machine-like repetition, a duplicat-
ing recurrence of old acts. With conflict of habits and
release of impulse there is conscious search.”
 
14
 
 
Accordingly, Dewey writes, “Yet if one starts with the
biological-cultural approach to the theory of experiencing,
the presence of native and acquired (like habits) 
 
general
ways
 
 of behavior is an inescapable datum.”
 
15
 
 Because of
the essence of habit as an acquired predisposition to 
 
ways
 
or modes of response,
 
16
 
 the process of habit-formation
shows that human beings are endowed with the capacity
for accomplishing the “integration of organic-environmen-
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tal connections,” something other animals lack.
 
17
 
 This
capacity of integration is activated by language, communi-
cation, discourse, on the basis of which individual experi-
ences are integrated in the social environment. It is
through learning and habit-formation that human beings
achieve the integration of the past into the present and
make future expectations appear real to present experi-
ences. It follows that habit is never mere repetition unless
it is taken in isolation, in which case it is a “non-communi-
cating habit”. But insofar as communication is a criterion
of human life, it is difficult to think of this type of habit.
Thus, the principle of habit-formation is essentially
dynamic because,
 
Communication not only increases the number and vari-
ety of habits, but tends to link them subtly together, and
eventually to subject habit-formation in a particular case
to the habit of recognizing that new modes of association
will exact a new use of it. Thus habit is formed in view of
possible future changes and does not harden so readily.
As soon as a child secretes from others the manifestation
of a habit there is proof that he is practically aware that he
forms a habit subject to the requirements of others as to
his further habit formations.
 
18
 
 
 
Therefore, consciousness is always present in habit-
formation. As one learns, his needs and relationships with
the social environment increase. Each acquired habit
requires appropriate conditions for its execution. As hab-
its increase in complexity and number, the organism is
forced to find a method of inquiry, a method involving
experimentation through trial and error. Consequently,
the more an organism is capable of forming new habits,
the more it increases its adaptability, sensitiveness,
responsiveness, explosiveness, and susceptibility. Human
beings are endowed with these powers thanks to their
capacity of social discourse, something other animals
seem to lack. Habits, as organic acts, are a sort of “fore-
action of mind,” for they always appear as deliberate and
consciously intelligent. Indeed, habit is of the nature of
generals or universals. It is the process of thirdness that
gives meaning, the logical interpretant that bridges the
gap between behavior and meaning.   
 
—Tamba Nlandu is an assistant professor of philosophy
at John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. He currently
teaches courses in American philosophy, African philosophy,
contemporary ethical issues, and the philosophy of sport. 
E-mail = tnlandu@jcu.edu
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Selves and Communities in the 
Work of William James
 
by Francesca Bordogna
 
Introduction
 
 
Late-nineteenth-century America experienced a crisis
of the autonomous, substantial, and integrated self that
was embodied in the social and economic practices of
American democracy.
 
1
 
 A diverse literature portrayed the
human subject as weakened, torn between conflicting
social roles, and depending in its essence and trajectory
on social networks and economic forces beyond individ-
ual control.
 
2
 
 From opposite ends of the political spectrum
social scientists and economists writing about market
society relocated agency from the individual to the social
group,
 
3
 
 while socialist utopias painted visions of coopera-
tive societies premised on altruism, sympathy, and the
demise of what Edward Bellamy condemned as the “nar-
row, isolated, and incommodious individuality.” 
 
4
 
 All the
while “mental” physiologists, men of science, and novel-
ists painted the human being as controlled by biological
forces and steered by automatic reflex processes.
Still extolled in heroic narratives, the independent
and sovereign self appeared to be less and less in control
of body and mind, even hardly capable of pulling itself
together. A range of mental pathologies and extraordinary
phenomena provided concrete expression to the inner
divisiveness of the modern self. An incomplete list would
include: split personality, hypnotic trance, the trance of a
medium, automatic writing—a practice in which the hand
of a person, unknown to the mind, would write things of
which the subject had no knowledge—and projection of
the double, an occult practice during which the subject
strove to project a second self, separated from the physi-
cal body, in the external space.
 
5
 
 To many, these phenom-
ena and practices seemed to stem from an alien
personality that had taken possession of one’s body. They
became central to the modernistic exercise of redefining
subjectivity and figured prominently in William James’s
account of the self. 
In published and unpublished texts spread from the
1880s to the end of his life (1910) and contributing to
fields as diverse as normal psychology, clinical psychol-
ogy, psychical research (what we might call parapsychol-
ogy), the science of religion, characterology, social
psychology, popular philosophy, and technical metaphys-
ics, James assembled a new form of selfhood, one that
fully acknowledged the inner divisiveness of the self and
the presence of biological driving factors, and yet prom-
ised a new sense of self-mastery, self-determination,
agency, and unity. It was a type of selfhood compatible
with the discoveries of modern physiology and capable of
engaging the new situation of the human subject in a fully
industrialized society. 
 This paper suggests that James’s account of the self
developed in tandem with his social vision. The Jamesian
self promoted social transformation and the creation of a
strong and virtuous citizenry that could participate in
political action and initiate effective social change in a plu-
ralistic, democratic society. The paper also argues that
James’s account of the self represented an attempt to
rethink the relationship between individual and society in
a way that would allow both for pluralism and for commu-
nity. It made it possible to imagine a type of social interac-
tion that was fundamentally different from the occasional
intersection of the isolated trajectories of the economic
men of classical liberal thought—one that was rooted,
instead, in intimacy and solidarity. Like a range of political
and social thinkers with whom he engaged, with his dis-
course of the self James explored and promoted visions of
solidarity and cooperation that he believed could be
opened up within future society. This social vision, as I
suggest in the last section of the paper, found expression
in James’s panpsychic metaphysics. 
 
Part 1: Topologies of the Self 
1.1 The divided self
 
James’s account of the self fully acknowledged the
inner division of the modern subject. Like other psycholo-
gists of the time, James challenged the dogma of the unity
and simplicity of the self. In Chapter Ten of 
 
Principles of
Psychology 
 
(1890)—the only text in which James ever
dealt systematically with the notion of the self—James
famously split the self into two parts: the Ego, that is the
principle of felt personal identity, and the Me, or “empiri-
cal self.”
 
6
 
 He immediately split the Me into a variety of
sub-selves which could occasionally live peacefully next to
each other, each practicing its own social role, but could
also be at odds.
 
 7
 
 These included the “material self,” a per-
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son’s various social selves, and a spiritual self which
James famously identified with certain perceived motions
in the head.
 
8
 
 
Like the Me, the second pole of the self, the Ego—or
the principle of personal identity and personal unity—was
not immune from division. While aimed at accounting for
the 
 
feeling
 
 that each of us has of his/her own personal
unity, James’s labyrinthine discussion of the Ego fully
acknowledged the fundamental divisiveness of the Ego.
James’s multi-layered metaphor of the herd of cattle, col-
lected together at spring by the herdsman, dissolved the
principle of personal identity into a “mixture of unity and
diversity.”
 
9
 
The self described in 
 
Principles 
 
was traversed by
even deeper fault lines. James was fascinated by hysteria,
a disease which, following the French philosopher and
psychologist Pierre Janet, he took to stem from a lack of
synthesizing power.
 
10
 
 The hysterical woman, James
wrote summarizing Janet’s theory, was a person who,
because of nervous weakness, was not able to hold her
self together. In such patients, the self fell apart, and some
of the fragments occasionally coalesced, giving raise to
“secondary,” “parasitic selves.” 
In the 1880s and early 1890s James studied both
pathological and artificially induced productions of disso-
ciation in a series of experiments on automatic writing,
hypnotic trance, and post-hypnotic suggestion.
 
11
 
 Like
other contemporaries, James took some of these experi-
ments to indicate that the dissociated, parasitic self could
not only “alternate” with the primary self (as in classical
cases of split personality), but could also “coexist” with
it.
 
12
 
 The question that James, like many other psycholo-
gists of the time, asked himself was whether this type of
dissociation was always necessarily a mark of pathology,
or whether separation between a normal and a ‘sublimi-
nal” self could be a normal human feature. James came
cautiously to lean towards a positive answer. By the early
1900s he had accepted the idea that each individual was
endowed with a more or less developed “subliminal” self. 
 
1.2 Stretching the boundaries of the self 
 
“Where does the self end?”, Madame Merle asked
Isabelle Archer, the heroine of Henry James’s 
 
The
 
 
 
Por-
trait of a Lady
 
 (1882).
 
13
 
 William James asked himself the
same question. What do the boundaries of the self look
like? How far do they stretch? To James these were the
important questions raised by automatic writing and other
“psychic” phenomena.
 
14
 
 Through an investigation of men-
tal pathologies and supernormal phenomena James came
to question the dogma of the “insularity” of the self and
the belief that an impenetrable fence separates the selves
belonging to different individuals. 
Sometime by the late 1890s James found himself
leaning toward the hypothesis that the self could no
longer be understood as an enclosed, insular unit, but
instead might merge, at its margins or beyond the mar-
gins, into a larger self.
 
15
 
 In his essay on “Human Immor-
tality” (1898), James visualized that idea resorting to an
image that German physiologist and mystical writer
Gustav Theodor Fechner had deployed to illustrate the
notion of “threshold of consciousness.” The sinusoidal
graph—which James borrowed from Fechner’s 
 
Elemente
der Psychophysik
 
 (1860-1862), represents a “wave of con-
sciousness.”
 
 16
 
 
The threshold of consciousness—visualized by the hori-
zontal straight line—is the boundary separating what we
are conscious of (everything above the straight line) from
what we are not conscious of (everything below the line).
The horizontal line can move down or up, as we become
more alert, or more drowsy; thus things of which we are
not aware at one moment, can enter our field of conscious-
ness at another, and vice-versa. The portion below the
threshold represents a larger self (possibly God, or possi-
bly an individual self), of which one’s conscious self is
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part. Based on Fechner, however, James’s discussion of
the graph conveyed a more complex hypothesis, one that
commentators have seldom noticed. The separate por-
tions of the curve surfacing above the threshold line rep-
resented the (normal) consciousnesses of 
 
different
 
individuals. Thus the image shows that these different,
individual selves, each of which takes itself to be isolated
from the others, may not be really separated: they could
communicate and merge into each other below the
threshold.
This conclusion was reinforced by evidence concern-
ing mystical experiences and psychical phenomena. Par-
ticularly relevant to James was the work of his
 
 
 
friend the
British psychical researcher F. W. H. Myers. Myers had
taken the phenomena of telepathy (a word that he
invented), telekinesis, projection of the double, bilocation,
and traveling clairvoyance to indicate that the subliminal
self, far from being confined within the boundaries of the
body, could step out of the body, invade physical space,
and communicate with the spirits of the departed and with
a wider “cosmic environment.” While skeptical about
Myers’ generalizations, James came to look at the hypoth-
esis of extra-marginal communication between different
selves as a proven fact.
In an article that he published one year before his
death James wrote: 
 
Out of my experience...(and it is limited enough)
one fixed conclusion dogmatically emerges, and that
is this, that we with our lives are like islands in the
sea, or like trees in the forest. The maple and the
pine may whisper to each other with their
leaves...But the trees also commingle their roots in
the darkness underground, and the islands also hang
together through the ocean s bottom. Just so there is
a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which
our individuality builds but accidental fences, and
into which our several minds plunge as into a
mother-sea, or reservoir.
 
17
 
Circumscribing and insulating the self from external
influences was part of the individual process of adaptation
to the “external earthly environment.” Yet the fence sur-
rounding the self remained “weak in spots, and fitful influ-
ences from beyond leak[ed] in, showing the otherwise
unverifiable common connexion.”
 
18
 
 But how did distinct
subliminal selves communicate? Were they “continuous”
with each other, or did they remain separate from one
another, “their intercourse [being] transacted across an
isolating interval?” 
 
19
 
 What would a topology of the mar-
gins and of the extra-marginal region look like?
 
20
 
 
These are questions which James began to address
within the panpsychist metaphysics that he articulated in
the last years of his life. I will come back to that in the last
section of the paper. 
 
Part 2: Individuals and Community
 
James wrote little on politics and only in an unsystem-
atic way. Nevertheless, while scholars disagree on the
exact nature of James’s political position, few still resist
the notion that he developed a social vision. In response
to the mounting American imperialism under the presi-
dency of McKinley, James found himself to be growing
“more individualistic,” even “anarchistic.” He engaged in
a passionate defense of self-governance both for ethnic
groups, like the Filipinos, and for the individual, against
the corrupting force of big institutions: “big national desti-
nies,” “political parties, newspapers, trade combines,” big
department stores.
 
21
 
   However, James’s individualism
was never anti-social and never translated into a gospel of
selfishness. James Kloppenberg, Charlene Seigfried, and
others pointed out that the individualistic strain so evident
in James’s social philosophy was tempered by a comple-
mentary emphasis on solidarity and community.
 
22
 
 Seig-
fried, in particular, has shown the importance of what she
calls “sympathetic apprehension” of other people’s points
of view.
 
23
 
 James argued that, when we look at other peo-
ple, as we ordinarily do, from the position of the “external
spectator,” we are bound to remain “blind” to the inner
significance of their lives.
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 This blindness was the source
of social conflicts, including that between labor and capi-
tal, which, in part, James famously ascribed to the inabil-
ity of workers and capitalists to “sympathize” with the
point of view of the other. Nevertheless, James observed
that sometimes the vision of that inner meaning comes on
us, suddenly, as in a mystical revelation, and we enter into
a sympathetic relation with other people. The lesson that
James explicitly drew from his discussion of this “ances-
tral blindness”—something he made central to his “plural-
istic, individualistic philosophy”—was one of democratic
tolerance, respect for individuality, and non-interference
with other people’s “own peculiar ways of being happy.”
Yet, implicit in his discussion was also an invitation to
sympathize with other people and engage with them in
more intimate ways.
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 Indeed in his social thinking James
constantly sought to mesh two apparently contradictory
elements: a pluralistic defense of the autonomy of the indi-
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vidual and insistence on communal values and “coopera-
tion.”
 
26
 
   
In articulating his conception of the self, James medi-
ated between the goal of attaining a democratic, moral
social order that made wide ranges of people happy and
conduced to social cooperation, and the goal of maintain-
ing the individuality and spontaneity that was being
crushed, on both individual and local communal levels, by
modernizing society. The self that James articulated,
especially in the late 1890s and afterwards, was the site
where it became possible to reconcile these two appar-
ently contradictory poles of his social vision. 
 
2.1 The cultivation of the self: how to make strong 
and effective citizens 
 
In 1901 Josiah Royce, James’s colleague and friend,
observed that supporters of “extremer forms of ethical
individualism” often found it convenient to resort to “real-
istic” theories of the self, that is, theories that made self
into a substance, “logically,” “ontologically,” and “psycho-
logically” independent of the existence of other selves.
Such theories, Royce argued, seemed to preserve in a
direct way “the dignity, or the freedom, or the rights of
the Self.”
 
27
 
 Despite his self-proclaimed individualism,
however, James always resisted the temptation of essen-
tializing the self. In comparison to the robust, substantial
selves assumed by most individualists of the time, he por-
trayed a metaphysically weak self, menaced by inner divi-
sion, surrounded by uncertain and porous boundaries,
and only precariously whole.
Nevertheless, strong, effective individuals were cru-
cial to James’s “melioristic” plan.
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 As James made clear
on a number of occasions individual initiative was the
engine of social reform: broad-scale social change could
only be spontaneously initiated by individual actors. For
that reason, individuals had to be protected not only
against the external social and economic forces endanger-
ing their self-determination and spontaneity. They also
had to be protected from inner enemies: inward division,
loss of self-mastery, and weakness. James lectured to vari-
ous audiences on the importance for individuals to culti-
vate their strength, agency, strenuosity, and integrity
through the reinforcement of good habits and the elimina-
tion of harmful ones. 
It was at this juncture that James’s discourse of the
self intersected with the “New Thought” movement and a
popular body of literature about the cultivation of the self.
Mind curers, Christian preachers, and mental hygienists
all advertised
 
 
 
techniques that would enable ordinary indi-
viduals to achieve self-mastery, eliminate inner division,
and obtain confidence, energy, unity, and inner harmony.
James was intensely fascinated by the culture of self-help
and thoroughly familiar with the literature and practices
of mental healers and spiritual therapists. 
James did not share the major premise that underlay
the doctrines of many mind curers and mental hygienists:
that is, the substantiality of the self. Nevertheless, much
of James’s psychology and popular philosophy can be
seen to draw from and contribute to this mental therapeu-
tics.
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 Indeed, much of James’s work represented a
“moral philosophy,” in the hortatory and practical sense of
the term that Pierre Hadot has done much to uncover.
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Precisely because he did not operate within a metaphysi-
cal framework that would automatically guarantee individ-
ual rights, moral agency, or even the basic unity of the
individual, it became crucial for James to point out tech-
niques that would make the self strong, effective, and
whole, and that would enable the individual to make him/
herself into a strong, competent, and effective citizen. The
practice of such techniques would reinforce individuals’
sense of agency, and provide citizens with the tools neces-
sary to resist the bureaucratic and standardizing forces of
society. 
In particular, James explored a range of techniques
for the unification of the self and the production of inner
peace and harmony, including spiritual and physical exer-
cises such as practices of breathing, meditation, and con-
centration suggested by mental hygienists and yoga
teachers.
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 To James the unity of the self remained a med-
ical, moral, and religious goal, one that the individual
should endeavor to achieve in a sustained, renewed effort
against splintering and dissolution.
 
32
 
 Indeed, that
renewed struggle was what gave the individual his or her
strongest sense of self.
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James fully appreciated the pluralistic possibilities
afforded by a conception of the self that allowed for mar-
ginality and difference even within the healthy, unified
self. This was particularly clear in the therapeutic
approach that he applied to Ansel Bourne, a famous case
of split personality. Bourne was an itinerant preacher
who, in 1887, had suddenly disappeared from his home.
He resurfaced two months later in a different town, and
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appeared to have lived under the new name of “A. J.
Brown.” Brown knew nothing about Bourne, nor could
Bourne ever recall anything about Brown. James hypno-
tized Bourne several times between May 27th and June
7th, 1890. 34 During the hypnotic sessions, James did not
try to “kill” the secondary personality, but rather
attempted to “introduce” the two personalities to each
other, so they could acknowledge each other’s presence
and live peacefully in the same body.35 Far from resem-
bling the simple, undivided unit postulated by moral phi-
losophers, the Jamesian unified self remained a “bundle
of relations,” a pluralistic community of things, one within
which relationships between members had to be continu-
ally renegotiated and redefined. 36 
2.2 Ecstasy and community 
James never spelled out all the social and political
implications of his account of the self, but alluded to them
obliquely with metaphors and poetical language, by shift-
ing to first person narratives in the midst of philosophical
arguments and by using quotations which would have
evoked dense webs of meanings to his contemporaries.
The social vision that James embodied in his account of
the self is so “vague” that it can only be retrieved and deci-
phered by embedding James’s text within a context of
late-nineteenth-century works which did more explicitly
than James, linked visions of selfhood to visions of soci-
ety. Yet even the vague deserves attention in the work of a
writer who like James fully appreciated the expressive
potential of vagueness.37 By placing James’s account of
the self in the context of wider debates over the social
order one can appreciate something that would otherwise
escape notice. James’s insistence on the fluidity and
uncertainty of the boundaries of the self, which he espe-
cially emphasized in the last decade of his life, was instru-
mental to rooting the individual in community. 
 James was familiar with the work of various thinkers
who had mobilized theories positing an unsubstantial,
“open” self in order to further visions of community and
cooperation. For one thing, he knew well his father’s
vision of “regenerate society.” An unorthodox follower of
Swedenborg and of Fourier’s utopian socialism, Henry
James Sr. had envisioned an ideal society (“the brother-
hood of each man with each man in God”) in which the
individual would give up his selfish tendencies, indeed,
his very self-hood, in order to cooperate with all. 38 Will-
iam James could hardly miss the point. Discussing his
father’s social vision, William James wrote: “The individ-
ual man, as such, is nothing, but owes all he is and has to
the race nature he inherits, and to the society in which he
is born.”39 Likewise, James was familiar with the popular
books of Ralph Waldo Trine, a self-educated mind curer
and an evangelical socialist. Trine declared that the indi-
vidual self was illusory and he dissolved it into an “infinite
spirit” pervading everything. The realization of the insig-
nificance of the individual self was to be the panacea for
individual happiness and social health. By banishing all
self-seeking attitudes and their petty concerns for their
“diminutive” individual self, and by looking at themselves
as parts of the infinite self, workers and the common peo-
ple could effectively unite and bring about a peaceful solu-
tion to the grave tensions plaguing a capitalistic society.
The result would be a cooperative, sympathetic society in
which wealth would be justly redistributed among all
members. 40
Examples of authors conveying similar messages,
ones with whom James was familiar, could be easily multi-
plied, but one merits special mention: the British social-
ist/anarchist poet Edward Carpenter, whose writings
James discovered in the early 1900s.41 In 1900 James read
Carpenter’s Whitmanesque mystical poem Towards
Democracy, and enjoyed it immensely. In the four-hun-
dred-page poem Carpenter had managed to strike a diffi-
cult balance between the flourishing of the individual and
a rich communal life.42 In 1903 Carpenter articulated an
ambitious theory of the self. Drawing from the Hindu tra-
dition of the Upanishads and the Vedanta, he dissolved
the individual self into a universal, cosmic Self.43 For Car-
penter, the basis of social harmony consisted in the sud-
den, mystical intuition of the illusory character of the
individual self and in the sudden revelation of one’s one-
ness with the cosmic self. Carpenter’s theory of the self
34. For a report see Richard Hodgson, “A Case of Double Conscious-
ness,” in Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 1891-1892
(7), pp. 221-257. See also James, Principles, p. 371.
35. To that end James even staged an encounter between the secondary
self and the wife of the primary self in the home of the primary self.
The therapy was a failure, and neither of the two personalities ever
acknowledged the existence of the other. 
36. J. McDermott, “The Promethean Self and Community in the Philos-
ophy of William James,” in Streams of Experience. Reflections on the
History and Philosophy of American Culture (Amherst, MA.: U of
Massachusetts P, 1986), pp.44-58. Quotation on p. 57.
37. C. Seigfried, “Vagueness and the Adequacy of Concepts: In Defense
of William James’s Picturesque Style,” Philosophy Today, 26 (1982),
pp. 357-367.
38. H. James, Society The Redeemed Form of Man (Boston: Houghton,
Osgood and Co., 1879), pp. 196 and 203. On Henry James’s social
vision see Dwight W. Hoover, Henry James Sr. and the Religion of
Community (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1969).
James’s vision of regenerate society did not include women. 
39. James, “Preface,” The Literary Remains of Henry James, reprinted in
Essays in Religion and Morality, p. 7.
40. R. Trine, What All the World’s A-Seeking (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell & co., 1899. First ed. 1896). Trine carefully discussed the
labor question in In the Fire of the Heart, of which James owned a
copy. 
41. James read several works by Carpenter, including Towards Democ-
racy (1883), England’s Ideal (1887), Love’s Coming of Age (1896), and
The Art of Creation (1904). On the relationship between James and
Carpenter see The Correspondence of William James, vol. 10 (Char-
lottesville: U Press of Virginia, 2002), pp. 614-615.
42. D. Barua, Edward Carpenter (Burdwan, India: U of Burdwan, 1991),
p. 3. On Carpenter see also C. Tsuzuki, Edward Carpenter, 1844-
1929: Prophet of Human Fellowship (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U
P, 1980). 
43. E. Carpenter, The Art of Creation. Essays on the Self and Its Powers
(London: George Allen, Ruskin House, 1907; first edition: 1901).
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created the metaphysical and psychological framework
for the socialist “brotherhood of workers” that he
expressly advocated.44 And indeed a contemporary
observer, the British Fabian socialist Beatrice Webb,
praised the book as a full expression of the “metaphysics
of the socialist creed.”45 The link between that Carpenter
posited between cosmic consciousness and socialism did
not go unnoticed to American observers. Thus, for exam-
ple, James’s correspondent Richard Maurice Bucke, a fol-
lower of Carpenter’s and a member of the circle of Walt
Whitman’s intimate friends, linked the mystical revelation
of cosmic consciousness to the demise of enclosed, indi-
viduated selfhood, and to the inauguration of a socialist
era.46
Carpenter’s theory was not attractive because it
seemed to annihilate the individual self or at least compro-
mise its autonomy. Indeed, in a letter to a friend, the
Fabian socialist Sydney Haldane Oliver, James com-
plained that Carpenter had “overdone the monistic busi-
ness.”47 To him Carpenter’s theory of the self suffered
precisely from the defect that James imputed to other
types of socialism: the annihilation of the individual in the
collectivity. Nevertheless, Carpenter’s work and, more
broadly, this heterogeneous socialist body of literature
are important for an analysis of James’s account of the
self. They reveal how in discussions of the time—with
which James was fully acquainted—attempts to foster
cooperation and community often went hand in hand with
theories of the self that denied the substantiality of the
individual self, weakened the confines of individuality,
and rooted—even dissolved—the individual self into a
larger self. Indeed, in discussing the weakness and tran-
sient nature of the “fence” separating the individual self
from other selves and in describing the sympathetic
insight into other people’s lives, James used language that
echoed the language used by Carpenter and others who
associated the mystical stage of “Cosmic Consciousness”
with the advent of a socialist millennium.48 As the social
visionary Edward Bellamy had seen back in the mid
1870s, love of others, sympathy, and solidarity rest on
ecstatic experiences through which stepping out of the
“narrow confines” of our individuality, we become able to
commune with the larger consciousness of the uni-
verse.49 
Scholars have long scrutinized the ways in which
James’s account of an open self surrounded by uncertain
margins allowed for the possibility of communion with a
cosmic, divine self. However, the scholarship on James,
including the scholarship dealing specifically with
James’s account of the self, has failed to notice that to
James—as to Carpenter and other socialist thinkers
whom James read—the weakening of the boundaries of
the self and the opening up of the self through religious
self-discipline and mystical experiences not only created
the possibility of communion with the divine, but also
allowed for intimate communion among people on
earth.50 In emphasizing how individuals could communi-
cate below the threshold of consciousness and beyond
the margins, and how they could realize through experi-
ences of illumination the continuity linking them, James
fashioned a psychological theory that promised to elimi-
nate selfishness and isolation. His notion of the open self
was tailored to allow for the sharing of experiences, sym-
pathetic understanding, and ultimately for social coopera-
tion and solidarity.   
2.3 The self-compounding of consciousnesses
James’s social vision required both individual auton-
omy and cooperation. 
Developing a psychology of the self and a metaphys-
ics that would allow individuals to retain their autonomy
and unique, defining features, while allowing for
exchange and cooperation, was tremendously important
for James. To my mind, this is one of the issues that pro-
pelled James’s anxious and obsessive attempts to solve
the metaphysical problem of “the self-compounding of
consciousnesses,” or, as James also described it, the prob-
lem of the “compounding of selves.”51
How can individual, separate consciousnesses com-
pound into a complex consciousness? For example, how
can the feeling of lemon and the feeling of sugar combine
in the feeling of lemonade? And, on a higher level, how
could individual selves (you and me) “freely” combine or
“be confluent” into a higher self (for example, the abso-
lute self of idealist philosophers), while retaining their
individual identity? How could each individual conscious-
ness continue to be as it felt itself to be, and, at the same
time, really be as the higher consciousness, of which it
44. Manifesto of the Sheffield Socialist Club, p. 372, cited in Barua,
p.95. 
45. Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Vol. II (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge U P, 1978), p. 268. Quoted in Barua, Edward Carpenter, p.
158. 
46. See R. M. Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness. A Study in the Evolution of
the Human Mind (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1969; first edition
1901), pp. 4-5. James read this book with great interest. See William
James to Alice Howe Gibbens James, Sept. 16 1901, in The Corre-
spondence of William James, vol. 9, ed. by I. K. Skrupskelis and E. M.
Berkeley (Charlottesville and London: U P of Virginia, 2002), pp.
542-543. 
47. James to Sydney Haldane Oliver, Feb 10 1905, in Correspondence of
William James, Vol. 10, p. 547.
48. For example, James’s metaphor of the trees communicating and
commingling through the roots echoed a metaphor used by Carpen-
ter (see Carpenter, The Art of Creation, p. 124). 
49. E. Bellamy, in The Religion of Solidarity, A. Morgan, ed. (Yellow
Springs, OH: Antioch Bookplate Co., 1940), pp. 17-18. See John L.
Thomas, Alternative America: Henry George, Edward Bellamy,
Henry Demarest Lloyd, and the Adversary Tradition (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard U P, 1983), pp. 83-88. See also Mark Pittenger, Ameri-
can Socialists and Evolutionary Thought, 1870-1920 (Madison: U of
Wisconsin P, 1993). 
50. An important exception is Gerald E. Myers. See Myers, William
James: His Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale U P, 1986), p. 350.
51. James, Manuscript Lectures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1988), p.
370.
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was a part, felt it to be? To many of the philosophers, psy-
chologists, and biologists who addressed it, the problem
carried political implications, and bore directly on the
question of the nature of the relationships amongst indi-
viduals within society.
At the end of his life, speaking to the large audience
attending the 1908 Oxford lectures that would lead to the
publication of A Pluralistic Universe, James confessed that
this problem had tormented him for years and that he had
filled pages and pages in an attempt to solve it. For years,
James told his audience, he had believed that the problem
was insoluble, and indeed, in Principles he had sharply
criticized those who attempted to solve it by claiming that
higher sensations (such as the taste of lemonade) are
“compound sensations.”52 Likewise, he had rejected
monistic philosophers’ claim that the absolute self was
“constituted” by the individual selves, each of which
retained its own identity and self-perceptions. To James
that position was untenable for technical reasons which
came down to the fact that nothing can be, at the same
time, itself and its other. 
In a wonderful example of narrative philosophy
James confessed to his audience how he had been full of
envy and resentment at the idealists, who simply assumed
the self-compounding of consciousness, ignoring the
objections of logic. All the while, in his “heart of hearts”
he had kept hoping that some day he would find a solu-
tion that would allow him to accept the self-compounding
of consciousnesses as a matter of fact.53 Now, however,
James had come to see the solution. In a metaphysical
tour-de-force James analyzed the problem once again and
sketched the metaphysics that would solve it. 
There were only three ways of solving the problem:
one could 1) either assume (as traditional psychology and
theism do) the existence of unifying factors, such as the
soul, and the traditional, external God of theism [but this
solution was not attractive to James]; or 2) give up the
principle of identity and logic; or 3) admit that the continu-
ity we perceive in life is illusory, and that ultimately life is
disjointed and irrational. 
As is well known, James decided to go for the second
solution. What stood in the way of solving the problem
was, simply, intellectualistic logic, and, in particular, the
principle of identity. As he told his audience, if you give up
the axioms of logic and, following the lead of Henri Berg-
son, place yourself d’amblée into the flux of reality, you
will see that no boundaries really separate any bit of expe-
rience from its next. Concrete pulses of experience “com-
penetrate” each other, “run into each other,” and
“coalesce” with each other at their margins. They “tele-
scope” into each other and “interpenetrate.”54 In short, no
bits of experience are really disjointed, and hence normal
logic cannot be exactly true about the world. Once this
metaphysics is accepted, there is no real problem in see-
ing how different consciousnesses (or different selves)
could be “confluent” either “in a higher consciousness”—
the “mother sea of consciousness,” or, perhaps, God, or
simply by virtue of relations of continuity from next to
next.55
Among the multiple reasons why the metaphysical
problem of the self-compounding of consciousnesses was
so pressing to James were important ones of a social-polit-
ical nature. This should come as no surprise, since James
informs us that his metaphysics of radical empiricism
“frankly interprets the universe after a social analogy.”56
To my mind, in social/political terms problem of the self-
compounding of consciousnesses translated into the
problem of how it was possible to create a community in
which individuals could retain their identities and individ-
ual perspectives, and yet have a sympathetic insight into
other people’s perspectives and into the meaning of their
lives. This is exactly what James insisted was necessary
for resolving social conflicts. Recall that in the late 1890s
James had identified as the central source of the class ten-
sions flaring between workers and owners a lack of
mutual “sympathetic” understanding, one that flowed
from the external position that each class took vis-à-vis
the other. Similarly, American imperialism, especially in
the Philippines, stemmed not only from the ineliminable
human instinct towards mastery, but also from the unwill-
ingness and deaf insensitivity that made the dominating
imperialists unable to engage the ‘others’ or to perceive
the significance of their proposed modes of life. The prob-
lem of facilitating a mutual understanding through creat-
ing a common consciousness had lain at the very center
of James’s social thinking from at least the late 1890s. His
new metaphysical approach endowed the “cosmic envi-
ronment” with a continuous, rather than a discrete topol-
ogy, allowing for continuity, even interpenetration among
neighboring selves along their boundaries. This way, it
showed how such sympathetic understanding could arise,
and how the otherwise “impenetrable” values and secrets
of other people’s lives could become intimately accessible
to those sympathizing with them.57 As Gerald Myers
insightfully wrote: “It is a common judgment that James’s
Anschauung was excessively individualistic and ignored
the role of community; on the contrary, he sought notions
of self and reality that permit communality of the pro-
foundest sort—in the depths of the most intimate per-
sonal experience. He hoped that the metaphysics of
radical empiricism and pluralistic universe would indicate
that a genuine overlap of many individuals’ experiences
might occur at levels of consciousness we do not yet
understand.”58
52. James, Principles, p. 160 ff. 
53. James, A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1977),
Lecture 5.
54. Ibid., pp. 121 and 127. 
55. James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 131. For the latter interpretation see
T. L. S. Sprigge, James and Bradley: American Truth and British
Reality (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), pp. 245. 
56. James, “Notes for Philosophy 9: Metaphysics (1905-6),” Manuscript
Lectures, p. 367. 
57. James, “What Makes a Life Significant” in Talks to Teachers, p. 151.
58. Myers, William James, p. 350.
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At a time when philosophers and politicians resorted
to monism to legitimate aggressive forms of imperialism,
James took great pains to emphasize that his solution was
not monistic, but pluralistic.59 The higher self, the super-
human consciousness embracing the individual selves
was nothing like the all-embracing absolute of monistic
idealism. The superhuman consciousnesses that he envi-
sioned were finite and plural.
 In his last Oxford lecture, he clarified the difference
resorting to a metaphor that revealed beyond doubt the
political nature of his concerns: “The pluralistic world,” he
wrote, “is...more like a federal republic than like an
empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected
[within a centre of consciousness or action] something
else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to
unity.”60 This metaphor embodied the two elements that
James continually worked to accommodate into his social
vision: individualism (and localism) and community. Else-
where James was more daring in indicating political asso-
ciations; as when he described his radically empiricist
view that “frankly interprets the universe after a social
analogy,” he described his radically empiricist metaphys-
ics as “the pluralistic, socialistic” view and associated it to
the vision of a “cooperative universe.”61
Conclusions 
James’s notion of the self grew in parallel to his social
vision. Although it denied the substantiality, the simplic-
ity, and the unity of the self—those very features which
nineteenth century individualists had mobilized to defend
the rights and priority of the individual—James’s account
of the self provided the individual with agency, initiative,
and self-determination. The individual was responsible for
unifying his or her own self through strenuous effort, for
continuously negotiating amiable relationships among
his/her various social selves, and for sustaining and creat-
ing afresh a stable identity. This continuous effort of self-
fashioning made individuals into effective centers of initia-
tive and social change, and enabled them to cultivate—
even renew minute by minute—the strength necessary to
resist the depersonalizing action of the big economic and
political organizations and the standardizing forces at
work in a capitalist society. 
The ecstatic experiences of the precariously bounded
self and the region of extra-marginal consciousness pro-
vided the ground for the sympathetic apprehension of the
point of view of the other, something which was funda-
mental both to the gospel of tolerance, mutual respect,
and pluralism, and to James’s vision of an anti-atomistic,
cooperative social order. Openness was the most distinc-
tive characteristic of the Jamesian self: the uncertainty of
its boundaries and its expansion beyond the margins of
normal consciousness allowed for mystical experiences
and also for mutual, constructive understanding: even for
the intimate “interpenetration” of what otherwise would
remain “impenetrable.” 62 It also allowed, crucially, for the
spontaneous creation of sympathetic communities, and,
on the long run, for a broader piecemeal unification of
society. 
James’s account of the self reflected and furthered
his hope for an open, pluralistic, and democratic society,
one that would allow for discussion, negotiation, and
cooperative action without sacrificing, as did many social-
ist visions of the time, individual selfhood to the goals of
cooperation and solidarity.
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The Paradigm of Consciousness 
and William James’s 
Conception of the Self
 
by Jonathan Mathys
 
In the first parts of the tenth chapter of 
 
The Principles
of Psychology
 
, William James presents us with a rich and
innovative portrait of the self, teeming with psychological
and phenomenological insights. In the middle parts of the
chapter he gives an analysis of personal identity that
makes it difficult to hold onto those insights. I want to
recap (1) the rich picture of the self and (2) the analysis of
personal identity that James delivers in his text. Then I
will turn to a discussion of the difficulties that the analysis
of personal identity creates for James’s own account of the
self, followed by a diagnosis of their etiology that places
James within a philosophical tradition I will call the para-
digm of consciousness. Finally, I sketch a path that might
be followed out of that paradigm, saving James’s picture
of the self by reformulating it in a different [dialogical]
paradigm. Throughout the paper I am relying on a distinc-
tion between personal identity and the wider notion of
selfhood that is inspired by some of the later work of Paul
Ricoeur.
 
1
 
I. 
 
I turn now to a brief summary of the substance of
James’s text. James has a fourfold picture of the self. The
first three parts are the material self, the social self, and
the spiritual self, which James calls the constituents of the
Empirical Me. The fourth part is the Pure Ego, or princi-
ple of personal identity. The 
 
material self
 
 is composed of
the body (which is its “innermost part” according to
James), immediate family, the home, and finally property
in the widest sense.
 
2
 
 The 
 
social self
 
 is the recognition we
receive from others. “Properly speaking,” writes James, “a
man has as many social selves as there are individuals
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their
mind.”
 
3
 
 
The 
 
spiritual self
 
, the last constituent of the Empirical
Me, is first defined by James as one’s “inner or subjective
being, [...] psychic faculties or dispositions, taken con-
cretely,” i.e., as traits of actual individuals.
 
4
 
 These disposi-
tions are more enduring and intimate parts of our selves,
and vary from individual to individual. Some examples
James gives in order to illustrate what he is getting at are
an ability to argue and discriminate, moral sensibility and
conscience, and an “indomitable will.”
 
5
 
 Now I turn to the
Pure Ego. 
James calls the Pure Ego the “principle” of personal
identity, and after a phenomenological examination of the
 
sense
 
 of personal identity, or how we experience it, he con-
cludes that all we can practically mean by “the Pure Ego”
consists of a stream of holistic mental states James calls
“passing Thoughts,” “each part of which as ‘I’ can 1)
remember those which went before, and know the things
they knew; and 2) emphasize and care paramountly for
certain ones among them as ‘me.’”
 
6
 
 These are the two ele-
ments of personality or selfhood for James: the passing
Thought or I on the one hand, and the objective person or
Empirical Me known by the passing Thought on the
other. The nucleus of the Me is always the felt existence
of the body at the present time, and the Me as a whole is
“an empirical aggregate of things objectively known.”
 
7
 
Those remembered feelings which resemble the present
feeling of the body are deemed to belong to the same Me.
James says that the salient forms of resemblance here are
a certain “intimacy” or “warmth” that past thoughts and
feelings have to us. Whatever else is seen as being associ-
ated in whatever way with the bodily nucleus of the Me
becomes part of that Me’s experience.
 
8
 
 Certain more or
less stable elements of that experience compose the con-
stituents of the Empirical Me described earlier, e.g., the
material, the social, and the spiritual self. The I which
knows these things, however, is not an aggregate at all,
but a holistic mental state, “a Thought, at each moment
different from that of the last moment, but 
 
appropriative
 
of the latter, together with all that the latter calls its own.”
 
9
 
So it is appropriation that binds the successive moments
or constituents of the self together into one overall self.
But there is a massive problem lurking here.
 
II.
 
The crux of it is this: it seems that there are parts of
the Empirical Me that 
 
no passing Thought or stream of
passing Thoughts
 
 
 
could possibly appropriate
 
. Consider the
example of an “extensive manuscript’ that James uses to
illustrate his conception of the material self. Perhaps I am
a renowned archaeologist working on a manuscript con-
cerning ruins in Syria. My former book on ruins in Leba-
non won me the esteem of scholars throughout the world,
and also recognition from the Royal Academy. How do I
(as a passing Thought) appropriate the high esteem in
 
1.
 
See Paul Ricouer, 
 
Oneself as Another 
 
(Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1992).
 
2.
 
William James, 
 
The Principles of Psychology
 
 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard U P, 1981/83), p. 280. Hereinafter referred to as 
 
Princi-
ples
 
.
 
3.
 
James, 
 
Principles
 
, p. 281. The foci around which these recognized
selves cluster are the various 
 
groups
 
 about whose opinion one
cares.
 
4.
 
James, 
 
Principles
 
, p. 283.
 
5.
 
Ibid. Some other possibilities might be a knack for and apprecia-
tion of languages, critical discernment in regards to some art,
what we call “being personable,” and probably also what Aristotle
called the virtues.
 
6.
 
James, 
 
Principles
 
, p. 378.
 
7.
 
James, 
 
Principles
 
, p. 379.
 
8.
 
Ibid.
 
9.
 
Ibid.
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which I am held by the Royal Academy? Can one of my
passing Thoughts appropriate 
 
my
 
 memories about the
manuscript and 
 
thereby
 
 appropriate as well the relation-
ship between that manuscript and the social recognition
my former work has garnered which generates the excite-
ment of the scholarly public as it awaits my new publica-
tion? Can this forthcoming manuscript, a putative bit of
my material self, really possess such value without its
relationship to my social self, and to my concern for that
self? Put otherwise, how can 
 
I 
 
as my-passing-Thought
appropriate the 
 
recognition
 
 I receive from 
 
others
 
? 
At this point, you might wonder if James is giving an
account of identity for the social self at all, and perhaps
you might conclude that James’s analysis is only meant to
hold for the spiritual self, as Richard Gale believes.
 
10
 
 The
constituents of the Empirical Me, however, are too inter-
woven for this to be possible. It seems to me that an
account of identity for one part must to a large degree be
an account of identity for at least one other part, if not
both. Suppose Gale is right that the spiritual self is really
what James is talking about when he talks about personal
identity. James claims that the body is the innermost part
of 
 
the material self
 
. He also claims that bodily feeling is
central to both the “Self of selves” at the core of the 
 
spiri-
tual self
 
 and to “real and verifiable” personal identity.
 
11
 
 So
unless there is some defensible sense in which the mate-
rial self and the spiritual self can have two different bod-
ies, then the conditions under which we feel ourselves
having the same body at the center of our spiritual self are
going to be conditions under which we feel ourselves hav-
ing the same body at the center of our material self. I see
no such defensible sense in which we have two different
bodies that would lead to anything other than paradoxes,
needless complication, and falsification of our experience.
That ties the spiritual and the material self together. 
The social and the material self also interpenetrate in
a fairly thoroughgoing way. Family members are said by
James to be part of the material self, but they must also
surely be centrally important parts of the social self, con-
sidering the dominant role played in the formation of per-
sonality by recognition from family members, particularly
parents. This importance diminishes later in life for many,
yet it never entirely drops out. Strangely, though, James
does not mention the family at all in his discussion of the
social self. What all of this means is that if James’s treat-
ment of personal identity and the appropriations that con-
stitute it cannot incorporate some 
 
part
 
 of the Empirical
Me, then it threatens to break up the whole Me alto-
gether. If one of the constituents goes, it can hardly avoid
dragging much of the others with it. And the example of
the archaeologist above has, I think, at least cast serious
doubt about whether James can incorporate the social
self. That the actual role of the social self in the makeup of
our overall self (identity) cannot be adequately captured
by James’s theory can be seen in another way if we turn
to consider cases of multiple personality disorder. In
these cases several personalities (or spiritual selves, to
use James’s term) that each respectively have a sense of
personal identity clustering around one shared body, and
that therefore share material selves to varying degrees
depending on which memories they share, are anchored
together in one overall self mainly by the stability of the
social self they all share. That is, their shared body is rec-
ognized by those around it as having an official name that
is recorded on its birth-certificate, certain familial rela-
tionships also documented, perhaps an occupation, his-
tory of employment and education, and so on. Thus the
overall self is stably located in social space by all of its
social relationships, regardless of how the various person-
alities may come and go. 
What lies at the root of James’s inability to hold
together the moments of the self he charted out in such
pathbreaking ways? My hypothesis is that the main rea-
son James cannot hold the constituents of the self
together in a stable way is that his analysis of identity is
situated entirely in the medium of consciousness. For this
reason James is, despite himself, still within the tradition
of the paradigm of consciousness. 
 
III.
 
This is a tradition that includes Descartes, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, maybe Kant, the Mills, and others as
well. James saw himself as standing in this tradition,
though he was very critical of it.Especially of its failure to
appreciate the place of relations in experience and its con-
sequent single-minded focus on discrete impressions or
ideas as the particulate bits out of which all of experience
and knowledge is assembled. For this tradition epistemo-
logical and psychological inquiries, including those
regarding the self and personal identity, are performed
within the realm of consciousness, and the general
method is one of introspection. Of course these thinkers
are not obviously still operating in the paradigm of con-
sciousness when writing about, say, justice or the social
contract (Locke and Hume), or cosmopolitan history
(Kant), though it is an interesting question whether atom-
istic conceptions of mind in Hobbes and Locke led to ato-
mistic conceptions of politics. The matter is more
complex in regards to Hume’s social and political
thought. It is in this sense that I will say that this tradition
operates within the paradigm of consciousness. 
There are a series of paradoxes that arose in discus-
sions of personal identity within the paradigm of con-
sciousness, and James in his own way has gotten caught
in one, though where his predecessors were caught up in
paradoxes simply with respect to personal identity, we
have seen that James is caught up in a paradox with
respect to personal identity and its relation to selfhood.
James may be vulnerable to paradoxes of the first sort as
well, but I will leave that aside. First, a quick sketch of just
what personal identity is in the paradigm of conscious-
 
10.
 
Richard Gale, 
 
The Divided Self of William James 
 
(Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge U P, 1999)
 
11.
 
James, 
 
Principles
 
, p. 288 and p. 319.
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ness. Predictably, it turns out to consist in suitably related
parts of consciousness or conscious states. The classic
example here is Locke, who held that “that with which the
consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself
makes the same person, and is one self with it...and so
attributes to itself and owns all the actions of that thing as
its own.”
 
12
 
 What joins together the consciousness of the
present thinking thing with something else is pretty
clearly memory, or perhaps conscious memory. This
gives rise to two classic paradoxes. The first is what we
might call a puzzling-case paradox. Suppose a lowly cob-
bler wakes up one day with the memories of a fine prince,
and the prince is either dead, in a coma, or has the memo-
ries of the cobbler. Has the cobbler become the prince?
Locke says yes. But it’s not so clear. Does the cobbler
suddenly speak in the cultivated idioms of the court?
Does he 
 
move
 
 like the prince does with that practiced,
regal, fluid gait? 
 
Can
 
 his body do this? It’s not surprising
that it’s difficult to tell. Locke shifts the criterion for iden-
tity away from the physical and into the 
 
mental
 
, making
memory the criterion for identity. But as Butler and oth-
ers have pointed out, our criteria for whether or not some-
one’s claimed memory of something counts as a 
 
genuine
 
memory often turn on 
 
physical
 
 criteria for identity, as in a
court of law when we are trying to determine whether a
person really was (or could have been) a witness to an
event. So one of our usual criteria has been put out of
play, and we are left floundering around without it,
attempting to settle the case.
This brings up a second paradox, of the offense-to-
common-sense variety. This is Reid’s Case of the Gallant
Officer (which I’m varying a bit). A young boy was heart-
ily thrashed for stealing mulberries from the market. He
grew up to be a Gallant Officer, and later even a Deco-
rated General. The Gallant Officer remembers the
thrashed boy, and the Decorated General remembers the
Gallant Officer, but not the thrashed boy. So on Locke’s
view, the Decorated General was not the thrashed boy.
But they’re the same person (says common sense)! After
all, the boy 
 
grew up to be
 
 the General! We may throw in
Hume to get a third paradox of this uncommon-sensical
kind. Hume shows what happens when you quite reason-
ably accept that memory is the only feasible criterion for
identity 
 
within
 
 the paradigm of consciousness while 
 
also
 
realizing its inadequacy. He finds no idea or impression of
a self within his consciousness. He reasons that memory
 
produces
 
 associations between ideas, which yields a 
 
sense
 
of personal identity. Seeing how unreliable memory is as a
criterion, however, he concludes that personal identity is
best seen as a fiction or creature of fancy.
 
 13
 
 So there isn’t
really any identity at all. So much for the paradoxes of the
paradigm of consciousness.
 
14
 
 
As Gale has pointed out, James’s theory of personal
identity, while breaking with the psychological atomism
of Locke and Hume by discarding the notion of discrete
ideas existing independently of each other in the mind in
favor of a holistic conception of overall mental states, nev-
ertheless retains two features of the consciousness para-
digm that will generate some difficulty for him. Firstly,
like Locke, James maintains that the medium in which
personal identity is constituted is consciousness. And
note the striking similarity between Locke and James’s
language. Where Locke says the present thinking thing
“attributes to itself and owns’ the actions of the past think-
ing thing with which it may join itself, James, de-reifying
the Pure Ego, says that the passing Thought “appropri-
ates’ past Thoughts to itself.    A recent defender of Locke
even uses the term “appropriates” when describing the
identity-constituting activity that goes on in conscious-
ness according to Locke’s theory. Winkler proposes that
“Locke is interested in a sense of the word self according
to which what the self includes depends upon what the
self appropriates.” 
 
15
 
 Secondly, like Hume, James con-
ceives of the self along the lines of a bundle of mental
items or states; in the case of Hume, ideas and impres-
sions, in the case of James, passing Thoughts. (Now)
Hume writes that “the mind is a kind of theatre, where
several perceptions successively make their appearance;
pass...glide away, and mingle” 
 
A Treatise of Human
Nature
 
 (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1978) p. 253. James replaces
Hume’s theater with his own stream, and Hume’s ideas
with holistic total pulses or states of consciousness, yet
we still have a self composed of elements that come and
go and are bundled together to create whatever unity it
has. See, for instance, James’s dismissal of empiricist psy-
chology in his proclamation that “there is no manifold of
coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera.
Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from
the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a sin-
gle psychosis, feeling, or state of mind” (
 
Principle
 
s, p.
180).
The key question any bundle-theory of personal iden-
tity must answer is “What is the bundling relation?’. We
have seen that for James it is the appropriation of past
Thoughts by the present, passing Thought. We have also
seen that this act, as conceived by James within the para-
digm of consciousness, cannot account for the appropria-
tion of the social self. So I want to turn now to a possible
remedy for this, suggested in some ways by James him-
self, and sketched out by the work of G. H. Mead, Ricoeur
and others, that involves a move out of the paradigm of
consciousness.
 
12.
 
John Locke, 
 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
 
. Bk. II,
Ch. xxvii, par. 17.
 
13.
 
This is true at least of Hume when he wrote the 
 
Treatise
 
, though
he realizes some of the problems this claim brings in train in the
appendix to that work. 
 
14.
 
I could mention cases from the more recent writings of Bernard
Williams and Derek Parfit, two contemporary representatives of
this tradition, that retain the same problematic, “conceptually
undecidable” features. 
 
15.
 
See K. P. Winkler, “Locke on Personal Identity.” Reprinted in:
Chappell and Vere, eds. 
 
Locke. Oxford Readings
 
 (Oxford: Oxford
U P, 1998) p. 153.
 Streams of William James • Volume 6 • Issue 3 • Fall 2004 Page 41 
 
The Paradigm of Consciousness and William James’s Conception of the Self by Jonathan Mathys
 
IV.
 
Out of the paradigm of consciousness and into what?
Into a paradigm which takes as its basic medium linguisti-
cally-mediated interaction, and not consciousness; in
short, into a dialogical paradigm. A short route to this new
paradigm would involve taking James’s assertion in 
 
Prag-
matism
 
 that “all thinking gets 
 
discursified
 
” as a major
premise, his contention in the 
 
Principles
 
 that personal
identity is constituted by appropriative acts of a passing
 
Thought
 
 as a minor, and concluding that therefore per-
sonal identity is constituted by an appropriation that takes
place in discourse. As the term discourse implies interloc-
utors, conversation, dialogue, and intersubjectivity, it
would then be easy to link up personal identity with the
social self it was in danger of losing in the paradigm of
consciousness, as well as the other parts of the Empirical
Me, suitably refashioned along dialogical lines. We could
even find the basics of such a reformulation in the work of
G. H. Mead. In order not to seem too short, however, and
perhaps willful or arbitrary, I’ll take one other suggestive
route as well, hoping that the partial convergence of these
two paths will sufficiently reinforce the basic point that it
is a dialogical paradigm which is the promised land of our
exodus from the paradigm of consciousness. Either way it
is the later James who will guide us in rescuing the earlier
James.
 
16
 
 
James explicitly provides us with the opportunity for
the step beyond consciousness in his famous article,
“Does ‘consciousness’ exist?” No longer is consciousness
an independent medium in which appropriation can take
place. Instead, we might say, it is itself a certain kind of
functional relation between parts of a wider medium
which James calls “pure experience.”
 
17
 
 What I am now
going to claim is that James in this article also provides us
with an adumbration of the direction in which our move
will head. The passage I have in mind comes during
James’s description of the two processes into which the
neutral ontological item he calls a “room-experience’
enters. Outside the context of some such process, the
“room-experience’ is just a bare 
 
that 
 
which may “act in
one context as [an object], and in another context figure
as [a mental state].”
 
18
 
 The first process is the 
 
personal
biography
 
 of anyone who encounters the room in what-
ever way and the second is the 
 
history
 
 of the room itself
(these are the very terms James uses).
 
19
 
 In ontological
space each of these processes intersect at the “room-expe-
rience’, and the total significance of that “room-experi-
ence” depends upon which process is under
consideration in a given context. 
The first process is clearly marked out as a narrative
genre, biography. The second process is said to be a type
of history. Two further passages from the tenth chapter of
the 
 
Principles 
 
reinforce the shift we are making here, and
lend credence to the hypothesis that James was prolepti-
cally sensitive to these dimensions of the self, at times
anticipating, albeit obliquely, the recent development of
narrative theories of the self. The first occurs in its open-
ing paragraph, when James says that what will follow is an
examination of the salient parts of “[the Self’s] history.”
 
20
 
The second occurs later on when James, in a remarkable
passage, speaks of “my historic Me,” which he identifies
with “my total empirical selfhood,” as “a collection of
objective facts...an I who has always been treated with
respect, who belongs to a certain family and ‘set,’ who has
certain powers, possessions, and public functions, sensi-
bilities, duties, and purposes, and merits and deserts.”
 
21
 
This passage maps quite perfectly onto the threefold
scheme of the Empirical Me—family, possessions going
with the material, public functions, duties, powers, merits,
and “set’ with the social, and sensibilities and purposes
with the spiritual self—and explicitly links it with a histor-
ical entity. 
In what follows, I am painfully aware of being unable
to provide an adequate defense of a series of claims I am
going to make, for reasons of space. For this reason, the
reader may take these claims as a mere sketch of a sug-
gested theoretical move. I assume that history is under-
stood primarily as a mode of narrative, a view Dray and
Walsh have ably defended.
 
22
 
 I also assume that all narra-
tive involves dialogicality, in the form of an author and an
implied reader, a view defended by Ricoeur and Booth.
 
23
 
Furthermore, I hold it self-evident that language is a con-
stitutive feature of dialogicality. If this is true, then mov-
ing beyond consciousness, into a realm of personal
biography, as James suggests, means moving into a dia-
logical paradigm. Selfhood in this new, vaguely sketched
paradigm is no longer constituted in consciousness, but
rather in communication. It is in the process of linguistic
interaction that the self arises, that we first come to relate
to ourselves as a kind of object, though one perhaps
unlike any other in our experience, in such a way as to
constitute the peculiar reality we gesture at by means of
this unusual, philosophic-sounding noun, “the self.”
According to Mead, the organized community or social
 
16.
 
The thought expressed in the quotation from 
 
Pragmatism
 
 used
as a “major premise” above is a specimen of James’s later, mature
reflections on inquiry and its practical, social dimensions. 
 
Prag-
matism
 
 is, of course, a late work, 
 
Principles
 
 an early work, consid-
ered chronologically.
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James’s position on this is somewhat obscure, but has been
called by some “neutral monism,” where “pure experience” is the
“neutral” stuff of which all things in whatever realm of existence
consist.
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Nebraska P, 1996), p. 15. Hereinafter cited as 
 
ERE
 
.
 
19.
 
James, 
 
ERP
 
, p. 13. “One of them is the reader’s personal biogra-
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group, in early years preeminently the family, is what
gives the individual her unity of self when she internalizes
the attitudes that community takes towards her, as well as
learning to respond to herself as others respond, and it is
the development of language that makes this reflexivity
possible, because it allows for significant symbols or ges-
tures to be directed at both others and oneself;
 
24
 
 when
this has occurred, we not only hear ourselves, but also
respond to ourselves, as truly as others do.
 
25 
 
This under-
standing is also consonant, for better or worse, with the
development of the “object-relations” school of post-Klein-
ian British psychoanalytical theory, especially in the work
of W. R. D. Fairbairn and W. D. Winnicott. 
 
26
 
 There is
clearly a space in James’s account into which this dialogi-
cal theory of the self can be inserted: that of the geneal-
ogy of the social self.27 Given the foregoing arguments,
the acts of appropriation that constitute the continuity of
the social self over time (and perhaps the other compo-
nents of the Empirical Me) must be intersubjective in
nature, though the details of this social construal of appro-
priation remain to be worked out. I would like to mention
in passing that this kind of account also seems to me to be
the one best suited to cope with perplexing questions
about identity in cases of multiple personality.28 In these
cases the social dimension of the self, overlaid on its
body, is the one that remains most constant during the
vicissitudes of the shifting personae of the subject.
— Jonathan Mathys is a graduate student in the
department of philosophy at Northwestern University. 
E-mail = j-mathys@northwestern.edu
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